Efﬁcient and secure ECDSA algorithm and its applications: a survey by Al-Zubaidie, Mishall et al.
International Journal of Communication Networks and Information Security (IJCNIS)
7
Vol. 11, No. 1, April 2019
Efficient and Secure ECDSA Algorithm and its
Applications: A Survey
Mishall Al-Zubaidie1,2, Zhongwei Zhang2 and Ji Zhang2
1Thi-Qar University, Nasiriya 64001, Iraq
2 Faculty of Health, Engineering and Sciences,
University of Southern Queensland, Toowoomba, QLD 4350, Australia
Abstract: Public-key cryptography algorithms, especially elliptic
curve cryptography (ECC) and elliptic curve digital signature
algorithm (ECDSA) have been attracting attention from many
researchers in different institutions because these algorithms provide
security and high performance when being used in many areas such
as electronic-healthcare, electronic-banking, electronic-commerce,
electronic-vehicular, and electronic-governance. These algorithms
heighten security against various attacks and the same time im-
prove performance to obtain efficiencies (time, memory, reduced
computation complexity, and energy saving) in an environment of
constrained source and large systems. This paper presents detailed
and a comprehensive survey of an update of the ECDSA algorithm
in terms of performance, security, and applications.
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1. Introduction
Public key encryption algorithms such as elliptic curve cryp-
tography (ECC) and elliptic curve digital signature algorithm
(ECDSA) have been used extensively in many applications [1]
especially in constrained-resource environments due to the ef-
fectiveness of their use it in these environments. These al-
gorithms have appropriate efficiency and security for these
environments. Constrained resource environments such as
wireless sensor network (WSN), radio frequency identifier
(RFID), and smart card require high-speed, low consump-
tion ability, and less bandwidth. ECC has been considered
to be appropriate for these constrained-source environments
[2]. These algorithms provide important security properties.
For example, ECDSA provides integrity, authentication, and
non-repudiation. ECDSA has been proven to be efficient in
its performance because it uses small keys; thus the cost of
computation is small compared with other public key cryptog-
raphy algorithms, such as Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA), tra-
ditional digital signature algorithm (DSA) and ElGamal. For
example, ECDSA with a 256-bit key offers the same level of
security for the RSA algorithm with a 3072-bit key [3, 4]. Ta-
ble 1 [5, 6, 7] shows a comparison of key sizes for public key
signature algorithms.
The preservation of efficiency and security in the ECDSA is
important. On one hand, several approaches have been de-
veloped to improve the efficiency of the ECDSA algorithm
to reduce the cost of computation, energy, memory, and con-
sumption of processor capabilities. The operation that con-
sumes more time in ECC/ECDSA is the point multiplication
(PM) or scalar multiplication (SM). ECC is used PM for en-
cryption and decryption, while ECDSA is used this operation
to generate and verify the signature [8]. One can improve
the PM efficiency by improving finite field arithmetic (such as
inversion, multiplication, and squaring), elliptic curve model
(such as Hessian and Weierstrass), point representation (such
as Projective and Jacobian), and the methods of PM (such as
Comb and Window method) [9]. Many researchers have made
improvements to the PM to increase the performance of the
ECC/ECDSA as we will see in Section 4.
On the other hand, the security improvement in ECDSA is
no less important than its efficiency because this algorithm is
designed primarily for the application of security properties.
ECDSA, like previous algorithms, may possibly suffer from
some of the security vulnerabilities such as random weak, bad
random source [1] or leaking bits of the private key. Also,
many researchers have made improvements to close security
gaps in the ECC/ECDSA algorithm by providing countermea-
sures against various attacks. But when selecting countermea-
sure there should be a balance between security and efficiency
[10]. To maintain the security of these algorithms it is impor-
tant to use finite fields (either prime or binary) recommended
by credible institutions such as the Federal Information Pro-
cessing Standard (FIPS) or National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST). The choice of appropriate curves and fi-
nite fields according to the authoritative organizations’ stan-
dards leads to secure ECDSA’s implementations [11]. There-
fore, we note from the above that any encryption algorithm
or signature should possess a high performance and security
level.
1.1 Our Contributions
Our contribution in this survey is to provide an updated study
of three important parts in ECC/ECDSA. These items can be
summarized as follows:
• Presenting a study on the efficiency of ECC/ECDSA in
terms of speed, time, memory, and energy.
• Investigating the security problems of the ECC/ECDSA
and countermeasures.
• Giving a description of the most important applications
that use ECC/ECDSA algorithms.
1.2 Structure of the paper
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section
2 provides basic concepts and general information about ECC
and ECDSA algorithms. Section 3 describes existing surveys
about ECC/ECDSA. Efficiency improvement on ECDSA al-
gorithm is presented in Section 4. In Section 5, we will show
the security improvement on ECDSA algorithm through us-
ing countermeasures against attacks. The ECDSA applica-
tions are described in Section 6. Finally, we will present the
conclusion and future work on this survey in Section 7.
2. Preliminaries of ECDSA
In this section, we will present fundamentals about elliptic
curve cryptography (ECC) and basic concepts of the ECDSA
algorithms.
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Table 1. Keys sizes and some information for public key algorithms
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ECC has been used to encrypt data to provide confidentiality
in the communications network with limited capacity in terms
of power and processing. This algorithm was independently
proposed by Neal Koblitz and Victor Miller in 1985 [12]. It
depends on the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) which is
impervious to different attacks when selecting parameters ac-
curately [13], i.e difficulty obtaining k from P and Q ( where k
is integer and, P and Q are two points on the curve). Small pa-
rameters used in ECC help to perform computations quickly.
These computations are important in constrained-source envi-
ronments that require processing power, memory, bandwidth
or power consumption [7]. ECC provides encryption, signa-
ture and keys exchange approaches [12]. Many operations are
performed in ECC algorithms (shown in four layers) as shown
in Figure 1 [14].
ECC uses two finite fields (prime field and binary field). The
binary field uses two types to represent basis ( normal and
polynomial basis) [7], and is well suited to implementation in
hardware [14]. Let Fq indicates field type, if q=p (where p >
3) then ECC uses prime field (Fp). In the second case, if q=2
then ECC uses binary field (F2m ) where m is the prime integer
[15]. ECC consists of a set of points (xi, yi), where xi, yi
are integers and the point at infinity (O) provides an identity
for Abelian group rule that satisfies long form for Weierstrass
equation (with Affine coordinate).
y2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x+ a6 (1)
When prime field is used over ECC, the simplified equation is
as follows:highlighted
y2 = x3 + ax+ b (2)
Where a, b ∈ Fp, 4a3 + 27b2 6= 0(modp). The law of chord-
and-tangent is used in ECC to add two points on the curve.
Let us suppose that P and Q are two points on the curve; these
two points have coordinates (x1, y1), (x2, y2) respectively and
the sum of these two points is equal to a new point R(x3, y3)
(i.e P (x1, y1)+Q(x2, y2)=R(x3, y3)) [7]. ECC uses two op-
erations for addition that are point addition(P+Q) and point
doubling (P+P ) (Figure 1), as in the following equations:
In the case of the point addition (P + Q) where P and Q
∈ E(Fp):
with using the slope λ = y2−y1x2−x1
x3 = λ
2 − x1 − x2, y3 = λ2(x1 − x3)− y1 (3)
In the case of the point doubling (P + P ) where P ∈ E(Fp):





2 − 2x1, y3 = λ2(x1 − x3)− y1 (4)
When the binary field is used over ECC, the simplified equa-
tion is as follows:
y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b (5)
Algorithm 1 ECC encryption and decryption algorithm:
1: Alice and Bob use same parameters domain D =
{a, b, q,G, n, h}, where a, b are coefficient, q is field type,
G is base point, n is order point and h is cofactor.
2: Alice selects random integer dA as private key.
3: Alice generates public key Q = dAG and sends Q and G
to Bob.
4: Bob receives message m from Alice, selects random inte-
ger as private key dB where dB ≤ n.
5: Bob encrypts message m with point P in elliptic curve
E(Fq).
6: Bob computes C1 = P + dBQ, C2 = dBG and sends C1
and C2 to Alice.
7: Alice receives Bob’s message and decrypts the message
by computing C1 − dAC2 to obtain plaintext.
Where a, b ∈ F2m , b 6= 0 [7], as addition operations are in the
following form:
In the case point addition (P+Q) where P andQ ∈ E(F2m):
with using the slope λ = y1+y2x1+x2
x3 = λ
2 +λ+x1 +x2 +a, y3 = λ(x1 +x3) +x3 + y1 (6)






, y3 = x
2
1 + (x1 +
y1
x1
)x3 + x3 (7)
ECC operations for encryption and decryption are explained
through the algorithm 1 [16].
2.2 ECDSA
ECDSA algorithm is used to warrant data integrity to prevent
tampering with the data. This algorithm was proposed by
Scott Vanstone in 1992. Data integrity of the message is
important in the networks because the attacker can modify
the message when it is transferred from source to destination
[17]. Many organizations use it as standard such as ISO
(1998), ANSI (1999) and, IEEE and NIST (2000) [7]. This
algorithm is similar to the digital signature algorithm (DSA),
where both algorithms depend on the discrete logarithm
problem (DPL), but ECDSA algorithm uses a set of points
on the curve and the generating keys are small. ECDSA
algorithm with key length 160-bit provides the equivalent for
symmetric cryptography with a key length of 80-bit [17]. It is
dramatically convenient for devices with constrained-source
because it uses small keys and provides computation speed
in the signature [18]. Moreover, four point multiplication
operations used in ECDSA algorithm: one is in public key
generation, one for signature generation and two for signature
verification [19]. In addition, this algorithm consists of three
procedures: key generation, signature generation, and sig-
nature verification. These operations are explained as follows:
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Figure 1. Arithmetic operations in ECC hierarchy
• Key generation:
1 Select a random or pseudorandom integer d in the
interval [1, n− 1].
2 Compute Q = dG
3 Public key is Q, private key is d.
• Signature generation:
1 Select a random or pseudorandom integer k, 1 ≤
k ≤ 1.
2 Compute kG = (x1, y1) and convert x1 to an inte-
ger x̄1.
3 Compute r = x1 mod n. If r = 0 then go to step 1.
4 Compute k−1 mod n.
5 Compute SHA-1(m) and convert this bit string to
an integer e.
6 Compute s= k−1(e + dr)mod n. If s = 0 then go
to step 1.
7 Signature for the message m is (r, s).
• Signature verification:
1 Verify that r and s are integers in the interval [1,n-
1].
2 Compute SHA-1(m) and convert this bit string to
an integer e.
3 Compute w = s−1 mod n.
4 Compute u1 = ew mod n and u2 = rw mod n.
5 Compute X = u1G+ u2Q.
6 If X = θ then reject the signature. Otherwise, con-
vert the x-coordinate x1 of X to an integer x̄1, and
compute v = x̄1 mod n.
7 Accept the signature if and only if v = r.
ECDSA algorithm becomes unsuitable for signing messages
(integration) if used poorly and incorrectly. Validation of do-
main parameters is important to ensure strong security against
different attacks. This algorithm becomes strong if the param-
eters are well validated [20, 21]. The authors’ recommenda-
tions are to update the validation scheme.
2.3 ECDSA Implementations on Constrained Envi-
ronments
The performance and security presented by ECDSA algo-
rithm, make it suitable for use in several implementations on
WSN, RFID, and smart card. Digital signatures in ECDSA
have better efficiency in devices with constrained-resource
than DSA and RSA. Many authors have pointed to the
possibility of using ECDSA with environments constrained-
resource (memory, energy, and CPU capability). In the fol-
lowing Subsections, we will explain using ECDSA with these
implementations.
2.3.1 Wireless Sensor Network (WSN)
A WSN consists of a group of nodes that communicate wire-
lessly with each other to gather information about a particular
environment in various applications [22]. This network often
has restricted sources such as energy and memory. Therefore,
a WSN needs efficient algorithms to reduce the complexity of
the computation in order to increase the length of the network
lifetime. In addition, it requires a high level of security to pre-
vent attacks. Several researchers have investigated the use of
ECDSA algorithm in WSN and explained that ECDSA is con-
venient for WSN.
For example, Wander et al. [23] presented a study in en-
ergy for the public key cryptography (ECC/ECDSA, RSA)
on sensor node Mica2dot with Atmel ATmegal 128L (8bit).
They found that transmission cost is double the receiving cost.
They analysed signatures in ECDSA with a key of bit-160
and RSA with a key of bit-1024, signature verification cost in
ECDSA is larger than a signature generation while RSA ver-
ification is smaller than a signature generation. They noted
that ECDSA has less energy cost than RSA. They concluded
that ECC/ECDSA is more effective than RSA and feasible in
constrained-source devices (WSN) because it generates small
keys and certificates with same security level in RSA. Also,
implementation was applied for 160-bit ECC/ECDSA and
1024-bit RSA algorithms on sensor node MICAz [24]. The
authors used hybrid multiplication to reduce access memory.
ECDSA results on MICAz are signature generation=1.3s and
signature verification = 2.8s. For the purpose of compari-
son, the authors implemented ECDSA also on TelosB, where
MICAz results were slightly less than TelosB’s results. The
authors proved the possibility of using RSA and ECDSA on
WSN. In addition, ECDSA (SHA-1) and RSA (AES) were
analysed in several types of sensor nodes (Mica2dot, Mica2,
Micaz, and TelosB) in terms of energy and time [25]. ECDSA
uses short keys (160-bit), which reduces memory, compu-
tation, energy and data size transmitted and thus is better
than the RSA. De Meulenaer et al. [26] discussed the cost
evaluation of energy (communication, computation) on the
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WSN (TelosB and MICAz) through the Kerberos key distribu-
tion protocol (symmetric encryption) and ECDH-ECDSA key
agreement protocol (asymmetric encryption). They noted that
TelosB sensor node consumes less power than MICAz and
Kerberos performs better than ECDH-ECDSA. Moreover, Fan
and Gong [27] implemented ECDSA on Micaz motes with the
binary field (163-bit). They improved signature verification
via cooperation idea of the adjacent nodes. Also, ECDSA’s
implementation was presented in sensor node (IRIS) [28], but
because this node supports 8-bit of the microcontroller the
author modified the SHA-1 code from 32 bits original to 8
bits. Through implementation, the original algorithm is bet-
ter in size and time than a modified algorithm. The author
explained the possibility of using ECDSA algorithm with the
sensor node (IRIS) held 8-bit microcontroller.
Recently, researchers in [29, 30] have applied the ECDSA al-
gorithm as a light-weight authentication scheme in the WSN.
This demonstrates the effectiveness and efficiency of using
ECDSA in WSN in terms of security and performance.
2.3.2 Radio Frequency Identifier (RFID)
Another implementation of ECDSA is Radio Frequency Iden-
tifier (RFID). RFID is one of the technologies used in wireless
communication. This technology has been used significantly
in various fields, but it suffers from constrained-resources
such as area and power. Therefore, many researchers con-
sidered ECDSA algorithm to be the best choice in RFID tags
because ECDSA is not required to store private/public keys as
in symmetric cryptography algorithms.
The hardware’s implementation of ECDSA algorithm has
been widely used on RFID technology [31]. Authors have
used ECDSA algorithm to authenticate the entity. They have
applied this algorithm to the prime field (Fp160) according
to SECG standards. They accelerated multiplication algo-
rithm by combining integer multiplication and fast reduction.
Through implementation, they get good results in reducing
chip area and power consumption (860µw in 1MHz). They
concluded that ECDSA computation requires 511864 clock
cycles. Also, Hutter et al. [32] proposed ECDSA processor
with RFID tag. This processor has security services (authenti-
cation, integrity, and non-repudiation). Authors used this pro-
cessor to authenticate between tag reader and RFID tag. They
used several countermeasures to prevent side channel attacks
such as Montgomery ladder algorithm, randomized Projective
coordinate and k randomness through SHA-1. Through re-
sults, the computation cost of the signature in this processor
is 859188 clock cycles (127ms at 6.78 MHz) and the area is
19115 GE. Implementation of ECDSA algorithm is presented
with prime field (Fp160) on RFID [33]. Authors exchanged
SHA-1 hash algorithm with KECCAK hash to reduce run-
ning time in ECDSA on RFID. Also, they used a fixed-base
comb with w=4 to accelerate and reduce hardware require-
ments. Results show that their scheme gets an area of 12448
GEs, power consumption 42.42 µw in 1MHz and signature
generation is less than 140 kcycles. With these results, their
scheme competes with other schemes for the binary and prime
fields.
Recently, the ECDSA with password-based encryption in [34]
has been adopted to improve security and privacy in RFID.
Authors pointed out that lightweight processes performed by
ECDSA in data signing are significantly effective in RFID.
Also, Ibrahim and Dalkılıç [35] used ECDSA with the Shamir
scheme to secure RFID technology. They applied the Shamir
scheme to reduce the cost of two scalar multiplications to one.
Finally, ECDSA has been implemented to secure RFID in IoT
applications in [36] have implemented. Authors proposed a
shopping system, during the analysis and evaluation, arguing
that ECDSA is suitable to sign users requests in the shopping
system.
2.3.3 Smart Cards
A smart card is a novel way for authentication as it contains
important information for users. This technology is used by
several algorithms to implement authentication mechanisms,
such as RSA, DSA and ECDSA. ECDSA algorithm is used in
this area largely because of the advantages found in ECDSA.
The design and implementation of ECC/ECDSA algorithms
have been investigated and they are used in constrained-source
devices like smart cards [12]. The authors used a java card that
supports the java language and the environment used is next
generation integrated circuit card (NGICC). Results showed
that the ECC/ECDSA is better than RSA. The results also
pointed to the possibility of using these algorithms in the other
wireless devices constrained-source. Moreover, the EC al-
gorithms (ECDSA and ECDH) with pairing were used on a
Java card [37]. ECC requires little data to move between the
card reader and the card, compared with the RSA. Further-
more,Savari and Montazerolzohour [38] concluded that the
ECC/ECDSA algorithm is more efficient in terms of power,
storage and speed than RSA on the smart card. On the other
hand, Bos et al. [1] discussed using ECDSA with Austrian e-
ID (smart card). They noted that ECDSA uses the same keys
many times; therefore, they pointed to improved randomness
in ECDSA. In 2017, Dubeuf et al. [39] discussed the secu-
rity risks of the ECDSA algorithm when applied to a smart
card. They proposed the development of a scalar operation
algorithm when applying the Montgomery ladder method in
ECDSA. They described that ECDSA offers a security solu-
tion for their smart card implementations.
3. Existing Surveys
In this section, we will present the existing surveys in
ECC/ECDSA. In this survey, we will focus on a study to many
of the aspects of ECC/ECDSA algorithm. To start with begin-
ning, we will present these articles and then explain the differ-
ence between our research and existing studies. Table 2 lists
existing surveys for the ECC/ECDSA algorithm.
• Performance and efficiency
First of all, in [40] performance and flexibility have
been investigated in the ECC algorithm with accelera-
tors through hardware implementations. Many points in
hardware implementations for ECC were discussed such
as selecting curves, group law, PM algorithms, and se-
lection of coordinates. In addition, it was pointed out
that the architecture of multiple scalar multiplication in
ECDSA’s verification should supported because this ar-
chitecture leads to efficiency in hardware’s implementa-
tions. Much research has pointed out that using hard-
ware’s accelerators leads to high performance, but it sac-
rifices flexibility, where reduction circuits should be used
to retrieve the flexibility feature. Similarly, Driessen
et al. [17] compared many different signature schemes
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Table 2. Different between existing surveys and our research
Paper Contribution of existing surveys Aspect Year
[40] Efficiency and flexibility in hardware implementations Efficiency 2007
[17] Compared many different signature schemes 2008
[41] Attacks and countermeasures Security 2010
[42] Hard problems in public cryptography algorithms 2011
[43, 10] SCA and fault attacks, and countermeasures 2012,2013
[44] Security techniques in WSN Applications 2015
[45] Attack strategies in Bitcoin and Ethereum 2016
[6] ECC/ECDSA with some applications 2017





(ECDSA, XTR-DSA, and NTRUSing) in terms of en-
ergy consumption, memory, keys length and signature,
and performance. Through implementation, the authors
found that NTRUSing algorithm is the best in term per-
formance and memory. However, NTRUSing algorithm
suffer from security weakness against attacks.
• Security and countermeasures
A detailed study in [41] on attacks and countermeasures
in ECC algorithm is presented. The authors divided at-
tacks to passive and active attacks. They explained that
the countermeasure for a specific attack may be vulner-
able to other attacks, whereas countermeasures should
have been selected carefully. Therefore, the authors have
made some recommendations in selecting countermea-
sures. Some surveys have studied public cryptography
algorithms in terms of computation of hard problems
(integer factorization problem(IFP), discrete logarithm
problem (DLP), lattices and error correcting codes) in
quantum and classical computers [42]. The authors de-
scribed RSA, Rabin, ECC, ECDH, ECDSA, ElGamal,
lattices (NTRU) and error-correcting code (McEliece
cryptography), as they pointed out that ECC provides
a higher security level than other cryptosystems; in ad-
dition, it presents advantages such as high speed, less
storage, and smaller keys sizes. But they did not dis-
cuss the use of ECC/ECDSA in applications and imple-
mentations of different technologies. Meanwhile, the au-
thors in [43, 10] explained physical attacks on ECC al-
gorithms, where they focused on two known physical
attacks: side channel analysis (SCA), and fault attacks.
They also described many attacks including these two
types, as they presented countermeasures against these
attacks such as simple power analysis (SPA), differential
power analysis (DPA) and fault attack (FA) countermea-
sures. Also, some recommendations were presented for
countermeasures that add randomness, countermeasures
selection, and implementation issues. However, none of
these papers investigated non-physical attacks on public
key signature algorithms such as ECDSA.
• Implementation and applications
A study on security techniques has investigated wireless
sensor networks (WSNs) [44]. It focused on three fea-
tures in WSN security: key management, authentication,
and secure routing. This study pointed out that ECC
algorithm was convenient for constrained-resource de-
vices. In addition, a survey on attack strategies was given
in relation to ECC and ECDSA algorithms in Bitcoin
and Ethereum [45]. The author pointed out that different
standards for curves (such as ANSI X9.63, IEEE P1363,
and safecurves), where this survey focused on safecurves
with SECP256k1 through using ECDSA, as this paper
referred to safecurves as one of the strongest curves stan-
dards. The author suggested many basic points to pre-
vent attacks on ECDSA or ECC. Finally, Harkanson and
Kim [6] compared RSA and ECC/ECDSA, and pointed
out that ECC/ECDSA exhibited the highest performance
with the same level of security from RSA. They noted
that 69% of websites use ECC/ECDSA, 3% used RSA
and the rest used other algorithms. They also described
ECC with some applications (such as vehicular commu-
nication, e-health and iris pattern recognition). However,
they had a duplication between implementation and ap-
plication. For example, RFID is a technology that can be
used to implement a particular application.
In our survey, we study the ECDSA algorithm differently to
previous studies. First, we integrate three aspects (efficiency,
security, and applications) into one search. Second, systemat-
ically, we provide different details (ECDSA aspects) of previ-
ous studies. Finally, we provide an updated explanation of all
these aspects in ECDSA.
4. Efficiency Improvement on ECDSA
In this section, we will discuss the improvement of ECDSA’s
efficiency in many ways such as scalar multiplication, coor-
dinate system, and arithmetic operations. In each subsection,
successive improvements to several authors will be explained.
4.1 Efficiency Improvement of Scalar Multiplication
This section includes many strategies to improve scalar multi-
plication; these are efficient in terms of scalar representation,
curve operations, and ECDSA arithmetic operations.
4.1.1 Representation Improvement of the Scalar
In this section, we explain the scalar representation methods
on scalar multiplication. Implementation of scalar multipli-
cation take a large amount of time [46, 19] in ECDSA and
ECC algorithms. Scalar multiplication takes more than 80%
for running time in operation of key computation in sensor de-
vices [13, 47]. Scalar multiplication (SM) or point multiplica-
tion (PM) is a set of point addition (P+Q) and point doubling
(P +P ) that generates kP (where k is a large integer and P is
a point on the curve) through P + P ...(k-times)[48, 49]. Rep-
resentation of 25 points in traditional double-and-add (D&A)
method presents as the following [50].
AA 25P = 2(2(2(P+2P )))+P
Or
AA 25P = 2(2(2(2P )+P ))+(2(2P )+P )
The efficient and fast implementation of ECC algorithm and
its derivatives are needed to accelerate SM implementation
[51]. As we can see from step 5, signature verification in
ECDSA algorithm requires 2 scalar multiplications (u1G +
u2Q) [52] that require operation of a complexity computation.
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SM uses three operations: inversion, squaring and multiplica-
tion (where it takes the notation i, s and m respectively) that
is considered expensive for an ECC algorithm [48]. These
operations are used to evaluate SM efficiently through imple-
mentations. When using the Affine coordinate system with
SM, both point doubling and point addition consume 2 mul-
tiplications, 1 squaring and 1 division operation in field [48].
Improving on SM leads to reduce computation cost, and run-
ning time and thus improve the efficiency of performance in
ECC algorithm and its derivatives. The traditional method
(double-and-add algorithm) in scalar multiplication uses base
2 in point doubling such as 2(...(2(2P ))) in addition to point
addition [48]. In this method, point doubling is implemented
in each bit in k (where k is integer scalar and represented in bi-
nary form) while point addition is implemented when bit equal
”1” in k [52]. Improving SM makes these algorithms con-
venient for constrained-source devices such as WSN, RFID,
and smart card [14] through reducing of running time and en-
ergy consumption. Many researchers have presented methods
to represent scalar in order to reduce computation complex-
ity in kP . Many representations have used for SM such as
traditional method (double-and-add), double base chain (2,3),
multibase representation ((2,3,5) and (2,3,7)) and point halv-
ing (1/2P ). All these representations lead to shorter repre-
sentation length of terms and hamming weight. For instance,
multibase representation (2,3,5) is shorter terms length and
more redundant than a double base chain (2,3). Representing
160-bit in multibase representation (MBNR) needs 15 terms
while double base chain (DBNR) needs 23 terms [50]. Some-
times, improving on methods of SM representation may bring
storage problems, for example, using point halving instead of
point doubling with polynomial base requires greater storage
in memory [53]. In the following subsections, we will discuss
methods to improve the representation of scalar in SM.
4.1.1.1 Double-Base Chain (2,3)
One of the methods used to develop doubling (2P ) is tripling
(3P ). This method was proposed to use bases 2 and 3 to re-
duce the execution time of the PM. Ciet et al. [54] proposed
a point tripling operation (3P ) and mixed it with point dou-
bling (2P ) depending on various methods to evaluate 2P +Q
when 1 inversion is more than 6 multiplications that lead to
improving tripling. They presented a comprehensive evalu-
ation through i, s and m for operations types: P + Q, 2P ,
2P + Q, 3P , 3P + Q, 4P , 4P + Q. The authors noted that
2P+Q is faster than P+(P+Q) but 2P+Q has slightly more
cost. They used the idea of Eisenträger et al. [15] in removing
y3 from equations when computing 2P +Q; the authors used
this idea with 3P + Q and removed y4 when 1i is more than
6m to reduce computation cost. Their results proved that this
scheme improved SM efficiency in ECC, ECDSA and ECDH.






Where si is ±1, and (2bi3ci ) are integer numbers and bi
and ci decreased monotonically (b1 > b2...bm > 0 and
c1 > c2...cm > 0). Furthermore, characteristic 3 was
investigated with both Weierstrass and Hessian forms [11].
The authors pointed out that characteristic 3 is efficient in
Weierstrass form, where tripling operation performs more ef-
ficiently than double and add, while characteristic 3 is not ef-
ficient with Hessian form (Triple-and-add (T&A) used with
Weierstrass and double-and-add(D&A) used with Hessian).
In addition, the scalar in the double base number system al-
gorithm (DBNS) is analysed on superlinear EC in character-
istic 3 [55]. Double-base chain is DBNS but with restriction
doubling and tripling and increasing the number of point ad-
dition through a Horner-like manner. The authors proposed
sublinear SM algorithm for PM (i.e. sublinear in scalar’s
length) with running time O( log nlog log n ), and it is faster than
D&A and T & A. They pointed out that their algorithm is ap-
propriate to use with large parameters in EC, where selecting
large parameters leads to improving performance and secu-
rity. Also, Dimitrov et al. [56] proposed double-base chains
method through prime and binary fields, using point tripling
with a Jacobian coordinate in prime fields, and quadrupling
combined with quadruple-and-add with an Affine coordinate
in binary fields. They used a modified greedy algorithm to
convert k to DBNS form. Also, they applied the same idea
that was used in Eisenträger et al. [15] to evaluate only x-
coordinate in computation 2P+Q but with 4P+Q to increase
SM efficiency. Through results, the authors have become effi-
cient in speeding SM better than classical D&A (21%), NAF
(13.5%) and ternary/binary (5.4%) in binary fields. In prime
fields, their scheme also gets better results than D&A (25.8%),
NAF (15.8%), 4NAF (6%). But results in [54] are better than
this scheme in term inversions (with binary fields) in the com-
putation case 4P and 4P+Q, where their scheme obtains for
4P (2[i] + 3[s] + 3[m]) and for 4P+Q (3[i] + 3[s] + 5[m]). Re-
sults in [54] are 4P (1[i] + 5[s] + 8[m]) and 4P+Q(2[i] + 6[s]
+ 10[m]) where squaring is free and ignored in binary fields,
while their scheme is better than [54] when using prime fields.
4.1.1.2 Multibase Representation (2,3,5)
Multibase representation is a method to improve SM through
using a point quintupling (5P ). It uses 3 bases (2,3,5) called
step multibase representation(SMBR). Multibase representa-
tion algorithms are shorter terms, more redundant, and have
more sparseness than DBNS algorithms. For instance, repre-
sentation 160-bit costs 23 terms in bases representation (2,3)
whereas 15 terms in representation bases (2,3,5). SMBR






Where si is ±1, and (2bi3ci5di ) are integer numbers and bi,ci
and di decreased monotonically (b1 > b2...bm > 0, c1 >
c2...cm > 0 and d1 > d2...dm > 0). Mishra and Dim-
itrov [57] used SMBR with Affine in binary fields and Ja-
cobian in prime fields similar to the scheme in [56]; there-
fore, their scheme is a generalization for [56] but with 3 bases.
They improved on a greedy algorithm (mgreedy) in order to
fit SMBR and to gain shorter representation and faster run-
ning. Moreover, they recommended using small values for
exponents because it does not affect cost. Computation of
5P was efficient with the prime field through 2(2P ) + P
and 2P + 3P . They found that 2(2P ) + P costs 9s+17m
(with Affine ) and 14s+20m (with Jacobian) while 2P + 3P
costs 22m+12s (with Affine) and 26m+16s (with Jacobian).
Moreover, computation of 5P efficiency with the binary field
(Affine) was 1i+5s+13m. Through these results, the authors
achieved efficiency in SM with prime and binary fields better
than previous algorithms such as D&A, NAF, 3-NAF,4-NAF,
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ternary/binary and DB chains whether with precomputation or
without precomputation points. Finally, Longa and Miri [58]
concluded that the cost of 5P +Q is 26m + 13s.
4.1.1.3 Multibase Representation (2,3,7)
Multibase representation is a scalar representation method,
which depends on base triple bases to accelerate point multi-
plication. It uses 3 bases (2,3,7) and is called multibase num-
ber representation(MBNR). This representation is the devel-
opment of previous representation methods (DBNR (2,3) and
SMBR (2,3,5)). Purohit and Rawat [50] proposed triple base
method (binary, ternary and septenary) with addition and sub-
traction. The greedy algorithm was used to convert an integer
to the triple base (2,3,7), through finding the closest integer
to a scalar. Their evaluation referred to this method as having
better results than previous methods of scalar representation.
They pointed out that septupling (7P ) costs is less than two
formulas (2(2P ) + 3p and 2(3P ) + P ), where 7P=3i + 18m,
2(3P ) + P=4i + 18m and 2(2P ) + 3P= 5i + 20m. Also,
squaring cost was neglected, regarded as inexpensive in the
fields with characteristic 2. MBNR representation was applied






Where si is ±1, and (2bi3ci7di ) are integer numbers and bi,ci
and di decreased monotonically (b1 > b2...bm > 0, c1 >
c2...cm > 0 and d1 > d2...dm > 0). MBNR (2,3,7) is bet-
ter than MBNR (2,3,5) in terms of shorter terms length, more
redundant and spare. The next example gives a comparison
between using quintaupling and septupling when points num-
ber= 895712 as mentioned in [50].
(usingquintaupling)
243752 + 243551 + 243450 + 213450 + 203250 + 203150
(usingseptupling)
293571 + 273371 + 253171 + 253170
This method presents efficiency in scalar multiplication better
than previous representation methods, where we note from the
previous example that septupling is more redundant and has
fewer terms than quintupling. Also, Chabrier and Tisserand
[59] proposed MBNR (2,3,5,7) to represent scalar without
precomputation. They investigated the costs in their method
when a = -3, the cost is 18m + 11s (prime field). The results of
their proposal indicate high performance in FPGA implemen-
tations with SM at high speed with storage level and execution
time.
4.1.1.4 Point Halving with DBNR and MBNR Repre-
sentations
This section will discuss point halving (PH) first, then bases
(1/2,3), (1/2,3,5), and (1/2,3,7) respectively. Point halving
method is one of the methods used to reduce the cost of point
doubling. It means extract P from 2P [48]. Knudsen [53] and
Schroeppel [60] separately proposed point halving in order to
accelerate point multiplication. They wanted to reduce the
cost of computation complexity in point doubling. Point halv-
ing was suggested to use instead of all point doubling, where
point halving is faster than point doubling in the case of us-
ing Affine coordinate on the curve (minimal two-torsion) [53].
This method was implemented on the binary field (polynomial
and normal). Both polynomial and normal basis perform fast
computations, but polynomial basis suffers from storage prob-
lem. This scheme neglected squaring operation and evaluation
as it depends on inversion and multiplication. To implement
point halving on binary field in curve, the following equations





u = (λ)2 + λ+ a (12)
v = x2 + u(λ+ 1) (13)
Through previous equations, we get point halving; the sec-
ond equation gives us λ value, the third equation gives us x
and subsequently uses values of x, λ to get y value from the
first equation. Fong et al. [61] presented analysis and com-
parison between SM methods (point doubling and point halv-
ing) and used binary fields (F2163 and F2233) through reduc-
tion polynomials of trinomial and pentanomial (using polyno-
mial basis instead of normal) on standards of NIST’s FIPS
186-2. Through analysis, they found that point halving is
faster (29%) than point doubling when P is known in ad-
vance. Also, they noted τ -adic (Frobenius Endomorphism)
used in [62] faster than PH. They presented a comparison be-
tween double-and-add and halve-and-add (H&A) over F2163
through Affine and Projective coordinate systems. Also, they
pointed out that point doubling can use with mixed coordi-
nate while point halving must be used in the Affine coordi-
nate. They explained that signature verification in ECDSA
has 2 SM and this operation is expensive when P is known.
But performing ECDSA verification with halving is more ef-
ficient than doubling in addition to halving being better for
constrained-resources in the case assumption that storage is
available. Ismail et al. [48] mentioned that point halving is
faster than point doubling by 5-24%.
Point halving (1/2P ) is combined with DBNR (2,3) in [52] to
reduce computation complexity and to increase operations ef-
ficiency of scalar multiplication in ECC/ECDSA. The authors
implemented their scheme on Pentium D 3.00 GHz using C++
with MIRACL library V 5.0 that deals with a large integer.
Equations of scalar representation in this scheme are:
k′ = 2qmodp (14)
Where 2q a large integer and value it close to field size.










Where si is ±1, and (2bi3ci ) are integer numbers and bi
and ci decreased monotonically (b1 > b2...bm > 0 and
c1 > c2...cm > 0). The authors showed a comparison be-
tween their scheme results and DBNR with using the binary
field (163-bit, 233-bit, and 283-bit) and prime field (192-bit)
according to NIST’s standards. Their scheme achieved bet-
ter results than an original double-base chain, their results re-
duced 1/2 inversion, 1/3 squaring and few number of multipli-
cation and that led to improving DBNR in scalar multiplica-
tion.
In addition, Ismail et al. [48] presented improving on SMBR
method through using point halving with SMBR. The origi-
nal algorithm used bases (2,3,5) while the modified algorithm
used (1/2,3,5). The modified scheme adopted point halving
and halve-and-add instead of point doubling and double-and-
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add. It applied the following equation:











Where si is ±1, and (2bi3ci5di ) are integer numbers and
bi,ci and di decreased monotonically (b1 > b2...bm >
0, c1 > c2...cm > 0 and d1 > d2...dm > 0). The
greedy algorithm is used to convert an integer to modified
MBNR. The authors referred to MBNR (2,3,5) and modified
MBNR(1/2,3,5) as having the same terms but costs in modi-
fied MBNR (i=7,s=17,m=77) were less than original MBNR
(i=15,s=36,m=80) with k = 314159. Sometimes, the origi-
nal algorithm has fewer terms than the modified MBNR, but
modified algorithm remains less costly in operations(i,s,m).
The modified and original algorithm are applied on different
curves sizes (163, 233, 283), where each curve is tested with
100 random numbers. Results refer to modified scheme of
less computation cost (30%) rather than the original scheme
(2,3,5).
The authors in [51] proposed combining point halving with
MBNR (2,3,7). They used bases (1/2,3,7) instead of (2,3,7).
This scheme is less costly than schemes that have bases (2,3,5)
and (2,3,7). Also, this scheme is used with the binary field.
The authors referred to MBNR as being convenient for ECC
because of its shorter representation length and less hamming
weight. MBNR (1/2,3,7) representation uses the following
equation:











Where si is ±1, and (2bi3ci7di ) are integer numbers and bi,ci
and di decreased monotonically (b1 > b2...bm > 0, c1 >
c2...cm > 0 and d1 > d2...dm > 0). This scheme
presents improvement in the performance of scalar multiplica-
tion through reducing computation complexity. Through these
results, the authors pointed out that their scheme reduced in-
version to 1/2, and squaring to 1/3 and there were fewer num-
bers of multiplication when compared with previous schemes.
Table 3 shows the costs of arithmetic operations to represent
scalar.
4.1.2 Methods of Improving Curve Operations
In this section, we describe the methods which are used to
improve the PM by reducing the addition formula operations
(point addition and point doubling). In the second part, we ex-
plain that some research efforts have used the different meth-
ods for first part methods.
4.1.2.1 Improvement Via Various PM Methods
Many approaches can be used to improve PM methods be-
cause the PM operation consumes a large amount of time from
ECC and ECDSA algorithms. Many researchers have pre-
sented different methods to improve the performance of basic
PM algorithm (D&A) such as NAF, Window, Comb, Mont-
gomery, Frobenius. In this section, these algorithms will be
elaborated. Table 4 shows improvements on SM methods.
• Double-and-Add (D&A) Method
D&A is a basic algorithm in PM. It has been repeat-
edly used for two operations: point addition(P +Q) and
point doubling (P + P ). This algorithm is similar to the
Algorithm 2 The D&A algorithm
Input: point P on E(Fp); l-bits scalar k = (kl−1...k0)2
Output: Q = k.P
Q = P
for i = l - 2 downto 0 do
Q = 2.Q
if k(i)= 1 then Q = Q+ P
return Q
Algorithm 3 NAF algorithm:
Input: A positive integer k
Output: NAF(k)
i=0
while k ≤ 1 do
if k is odd then
ki=2−(k mod 4)
k = k − ki
else
ki = 0
k = k/2, i = i +1.
return (ki − 1, k − i− 2, ..., k1, k0).
square-and-multiply algorithm [13], and depends on bits
in scalar k after it was represent it in binary form, where
if bit in k has zero value, the D&A algorithm will exe-
cute point doubling, while if bit in k has one value, this
algorithm will execute the point doubling and point ad-
dition in each loop. In this method, the number of point
addition is a half of the point doubling. D&A method is
explained in algorithm 2.
• Non Adjacent Form (NAF) Method
NAF is the representation of signed-digit and was intro-
duced to reduce execution time in PM; it outperforms
D&A algorithm. It does not allow for any two nonzero
bits in scalar k to be adjacent [13, 52] and this leads to
reducing hamming weight as PM computation depends
on the number of zeros and bits length in a scalar. As
a result, this algorithm reduces the number of point ad-
dition. The NAF method is faster than the square-and-
multiply method [19]. This method can reduce the num-







Where k ∈ {0,±1}, NAF method is explained in al-
gorithm 3 [63]. When NAF is combined with a win-
dow through a random point in PM with the Jacobian
coordinate system, NAF can achieve an improvement of
33.7 addition and 157.9 doubling (with k size is 160-bit)
[64]. Also, Gallant et al. [65] combined simultaneous
multiple point multiplication with left-to-right window-
NAF, where they convert form (kP ) for PM to form
k1p+k2φ(p)(φwhich is Endomorphism operation). This
method improved point doubling (79 points) and point
addition (38 points) that lead to improving PM to 50%
better than traditional methods with Fp160. Similarly,
Mishra and Dimitrov [57] made a comparison between
their scheme (Quintupling) and NAF algorithm (in addi-
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Table 3. Costs of inversion (i), squaring (s), and multiplication (m) for scalar representation
Binary field Prime FieldScalar representation i s m i s m
1/2P - - 1 - - -
1/2 P + Q 1 - 5 - - -
P +Q 1 1 2 1 1 2
2P 1 1 2 1 1 2
2P + Q 1 2 9 1 2 9
3P 1 4 7 1 4 7
3P + Q 2 3 9 2 3 9
4P 1 5 8 1 9 9
4P + Q 2 6 10 2 4 11
5P 1 5 13 - 10 15
5P + Q - - - 1 13 26
7P 3 7 18 - 11 18
7P + Q - - - 1 22 28
1/2 & DBNR DBNR/2 DBNR/3 Slightly lowerthan DBNR DBNR/2 DBNR/3
Slightly lower
than DBNR
1/2 & SMBR SMBR/2 SMBR/3 Slightly lowerthan SMBR SMBR/2 SMBR/3
Slightly lower
than SMBR
1/2 & MBNR MBNR/2 MBNR/3 Slightly lowerthan MBNR MBNR/2 MBNR/3
Slightly lower
than MBNR
Algorithm 4 Frobenius with D&A algorithm:
Input: Point P , τ -adic expansion of k (kl−1, ...k0).
Output: k.P
P1 = P and P2 = 2P
for i in 0 to ( l-1) loop do
if k(i) =1 then
Q = Q+ P
else if k(i) = -1 then
Q = Q− P
P = Frobenius(P )
End loop
tion to many NAF versions such as NAF-3 and NAF-
4). Furthermore, NAF algorithm (right-to-left binary
method) without precomputations (to use in constrained
devices) was used with the mixed coordinate system to
improve PM [9]. The author compared his algorithm
with NAF (left-to-right binary method). Results showed
that this scheme presented better performance than NAF
(left-to-right binary method). Also, Purohit et al. [51]
pointed out that multibase non-adjacent form (mbNAF)
provided a speeding up of the execution time in PM with
improving scalar performance through multibase.
• Frobenius Map Method
Some researchers have used Frobenius map algorithm in-
stead of point doubling (2P ) because Frobenius map per-
forms squaring operations τ(x, y) = τ(x2, y2) where τ
is Frobenius [62] (that is replacing point doubling with 2
squaring), and is represented by the following equations:
2.P = −τ2P + µτP (19)






Where si is 0 or ±1 and τ is Frobenius endomorphism.
Scalar k value is obtained through the division repeated
for s by τ [14] as in the foregoing equation. Algo-
rithm 4 shows combining Frobenius map instead of point
doubling with D&A; this algorithm uses addition, sub-
traction, and Frobenius. Frobenius endomorphism (τ -
adic) was combined with point halving [62]. The authors
used point halving because it is three times faster than
point doubling; therefore, they used τ -and-add instead of
double-and-add with Koblitz curves; these curves have
useful features in acceleration kP . They used these
curves with fields sizes (k-163 bit and k-233 bit) to stan-
dards of NIST’s FIPS in binary fields. τ -NAF was used
to reduce point addition from n/3 to 2n/7. Results have
proved that τ -and-add based τ -NAF provides speeding
14.28% better than Frobenius method, and in addition,
it does not require of additional memory in the case us-
ing of normal basis. Frobenius expansion method for the
special hyperelliptic curve (introduced by Koblitz) with
GLV(Gallant-Lambert-Vanstone) endomorphism (using
fields of large characteristic) is presented to improve the
efficiency of scalar multiplication [66]. Through the re-
sults, the authors largely improved point doubling while
point addition did not improve. This scheme improved
scalar point multiplication from 15.6 to 28.3% when it
was implemented on Fpn . Reducing the time and in-
creasing performance in ECDSA algorithm is performed
through exchange doubling point with Frobenius scheme
in the PM [14]. The authors presented ECDSA algorithm
with curves of subfields Koblitz for binary fields (key
length a 163-bit). They explained that binary fields are
convenient for hardware implementation. This scheme
achieved good results in performance over time where
key generation took time 0.2 ms, signature generation
took 0.8 ms and signature verification took 0.4 ms. In
addition, this scheme is suited for constrained-source de-
vices such as smart cards, WSN and RFID. In 2017,
Liu et al. [67] submitted a study of the application of
twisted Edwards curve (considered efficient models of
ECC/ECDSA) with Frobenius endomorphism to reduce
point doubling to 50% for traditional algorithms. They
used the 207-bit key (prime field) with two hardware
architectures (ASIC and FPGA). They pointed out that
their method offers high performance, less memory, and
time requirements compared to traditional Frobenius al-
gorithms. Also, they mentioned that integrating their
method with a window of 2 size would save 1/16 of the
point addition.
• Window Method (WM)
Window algorithm is intended to improve execution time
in D&A method through specific window size (terms
computation in a scalar); if window size equals one, the
window algorithm is the same as D&A algorithm. This
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Algorithm 5 Window algorithm:
Input: point P onE(Fp), Window width w, d = [l/w], k =
(kd−1, ..., k0)2w.
Output: Q = kP .
P0 = P
Precompute: for i = 1 to 2w−1 do: Pi = Pi−1 + P
Q=0
for i = d-1 downto 0 do
Q= 2wQ
Q= Q + Pkd
return Q
algorithm uses precomputation for points in the case of
the fixed point multiplication (FPM) and also reduced
point additions better than D&A [13, 46], as explained
in algorithm 5. Wang and Li [24] used NAF and win-
dow methods to improve performance for PM algorithm.
They found that window method is more efficient than
NAF. They used hybrid multiplication to reduce access
memory instead of multi-precision multiplication. For
a practical example, ECC results on MICAz is signa-
ture generation=1.3s and signature verification = 2.8s
while on TelosB is signature generation=1.6s and signa-
ture verification = 3.3s. The authors showed the possi-
bility of using ECC on WSN. Also, the variable-length
sliding window was combined with NAF method to re-
duce points addition (PM) in ECC and ECDSA algo-
rithms [19]. Computation complexity in PM depends on
bits’ length and zeros number in an integer. The authors
divided elements in NAF(k) to two windows (non-zero
and zero windows) and also divided non-zero window to
six types in sliding window. In addition, they used coor-
dinate system (Jacobian) with point doubling and coordi-
nate system (Jacobian Affine) with point addition. Their
results demonstrate that their scheme is better and more
efficient than NAF, wNAF and square-multiply schemes
in terms of efficient point multiplication and time of pub-
lic key generation.
• Comb Method (CM)
This method uses binary matrix (w, d) to compute FPM
efficiently, where w is row and d is column. It was in-
troduced by Lim and Lee and this algorithm is case spe-
cial from multi-exponentiation using Straus’ trick [68].
Comb method uses precomputation to improve PM per-
formance [13, 63]. as in algorithm 6. Comb method
was modified in [69] to improve PM through combin-
ing comb method with width-w NAF. This method is es-
sentially designed to reduce the number of point addi-
tion. It has presented better results than original comb
and NAF with comb. Also, it is used to accelerate mul-
tiple PM (kP + rQ) in ECDSA algorithm. The authors
explained that their algorithm is convenient for devices
constrained-source (memory) when choice suited param-
eters for an algorithm such as window size. It improved
computation complexity from 33% to 38% compared to
NAF with CM in devices constrained-sources.
• Montgomery Method
Montgomery algorithm eliminates division operation and
uses reduction operation efficiently [24]. This algo-
rithm was introduced by Montgomery and uses only x-
Algorithm 6 Comb algorithm:
Input: A point P , an integer k, and a window width w > 2
Output: Q = kP .
Precomputation Stage:
Compute [b(w − 1), ..., b1, b0] P for all (b(w −
1), ..., b1, b0) ∈ Zw2
Write K = (K(w−1)||...||K1||K0) padding with 0 on the
left if necessary, where each Kj is a bit-string of length d.
Let Kji denote the i-th bit of K
i







for i = d-1 downto 0 do
Q = 2Q,
Q = Q+ kiP
return Q
Algorithm 7 Montgomery ladder algorithm:
Input: A point P on E and a positive integer k =
(kl−1...k0)2.
Output: The point kP .
P1 = P and P2 = 2P
for i = l - 2 down to 0 do
if ki = 0 then
P1 = 2P1 and P2 = P1 ⊕ P2
else
P1 = P1 ⊕ P2 and P2 = 2P2
return P1
coordinate and removes y-coordinate, and this leads to
increasing PM performance.
A method introduced by Eisenträger el al. has improved
PM’s performance with an Affine coordinate in ECC
[15]. This method eliminates field multiplication in the
case of using left-to-right of binary SM. It eliminates y-
coordinate in addition, doubling and tripling operations.
This scheme led to saving field multiplication and thus
achieved an improvement of PM’s cost from 3.8% to
8.5%. For example, in order to perform the operation
of 2P +Q, authors used form ((P +Q)+P ); also in the
operation of 3P + Q, they used (((P + Q) + P ) + P ).
This trick led to the improvement in PM operation. For
instance, with a number of points (1133044P), the cost
of original PM is 23i+41s+23m, while the cost of im-
proved PM is 23i+37s+19m, namely, an improvement in
m and s. Ciet and Joye [54] used Eisenträger’s idea but
with 3P + Q when 1i equal more than 6m to reduce the
computation cost of PM. Also, Dimitrov et al.[56] used
Eisenträger’s idea but with 4P + Q to improve the PM
efficiency. Montgomery method is represented in algo-
rithm 7. Saqib et al. [70] suggested that using Mont-
gomery algorithm depends on the parallel-sequential
manner to accelerate PM in ECC with GF (2191) on Xil-
inx VirtexE XCV3200 FPG device. Their scheme im-
proved PM’s performance to 56.44µs. They compared
their scheme with previous schemes (different H/W de-
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vices). Results showed that this scheme presents better
performance. Also, they pointed out the balance of their
scheme between memory size and time. It was suggested
to use the Montgomery algorithm with ECDSA (with
keys length 224-bit and 256-bit) that has high costs in
both computation and communication [71]. The authors
analysed time complexity, where PM consumes a large
amount of time from ECDSA’s time. They pointed out
that Montgomery offers better performance than other al-
gorithms in constrained environments and mobility. Hut-
ter et al. [47] used Montgomery ladder algorithm to
point multiplication in ECC (with randomized Projective
coordinate) because it provides security against several
attacks and performs all operations with x-coordinate,
thereby increasing PM performance through implemen-
tation of ASIC processor with asymmetric cryptography
ECDSA (Fp192). In 2017, Liu et al. [72] adopted the
Montgomery method with the lightweight elliptic curve
(twisted Edwards curve (p159, p191, p223, and p255))
to improve speed and balance between memory and per-
formance (cost of communication, execution time, mem-
ory) as well as security requirement. They implemented
the ECDSA algorithm on Tmote Sky and MICAz nodes.
During the implementation, they noted that their scheme
offers memory efficiency which requires 6.7k bytes for
a SM process instead of 13.1 kbytes for the traditional
Montgomery scheme. They recommended the exact se-
lection of ECDSA’s parameters curves and the balance
between security and efficiency requirements.
In summary, the best algorithm for PM (ECC and ECDSA)
it is fixed-base comb with w=4 in random binary curves,
while in Koblitz curves it is fixed-base window TNAF (τ -
adic NAF) with w=6 in case memory is not constrained [73].
When memory is constrained, Montgomery is the best with
random binary and TNAF is the best with Koblitz. The au-
thors pointed out that Koblitz curves are faster than random
binary curves (F2163 , F2233 and F2283 ) for NIST’s standards
[73]. Moreover, Rafik and Mohammed [13] analysed in detail
the types of SPM (scalar point multiplication) algorithms (that
are D&A, window, and comb method). Examining the results,
they concluded that the CM method is faster than D&A and
WM because the CM uses less doubling and adding points, but
this method needs more memory. As for security, the D&A
method is the best with 27%. D&A is good at memory re-
quirements, needs more time. Therefore, they concluded that
several concepts of SPM in ECC algorithm (or ECDSA or
ECDH) are based on the user’s application and constrained
sources. If execution time is a large, the energy consumption
increases. The authors carried out the Secure-CM and earned
good time to implement (1.57 s); as demonstrated ECC is ap-
plicable in WSN.
4.1.2.2 Improvement of Efficiency Via Other Methods
In this subsection, we will explain a set of different ideas from
previous methods to improve ECDSA performance through
reducing consumption time in signature generation and signa-
ture verification.
A method was suggested to accelerate signature verification in
ECDSA algorithm [74]. The authors used a number of small
bits (side information (1 or 2 bits)) to specify the number of
allowed points in point multiplication; through the modified
algorithm, points double was largely reduced. They imple-
mented traditional ECDSA algorithm and modified ECDSA
algorithm on ARM7TDMI platform processor with a finite
field Fp384 by NIST, and achieved the result that modified
ECDSA verification is 40% better than traditional ECDSA.
They discovered that this changing does not affect ECDSA
standards and proved that their scheme has the same secu-
rity as traditional ECDSA. Also, an addition formula was
proposed through using Euclidean Addition Chains (EAC)
with Fibonacci to avoid difficult to find small chain [75].
The author has used a Fibonacci-and-add algorithm instead
of double-and-add (using Jacobian coordinate and character-
istic greater than 3). Some improvements were added to this
scheme through the window and signed representation to im-
prove algorithm performance. The author has compared his
scheme with many schemes (D&A, NAF, 4-NAF and Mont-
gomery ladder). Results indicated that his scheme outper-
forms D&A only in the case of improvement addition (win-
dow or signed representation). In addition, the improvement
of signature verification in ECDSA is achieved through coop-
erating of adjacent nodes in the computation of intermediate
results [27]. The proposed scheme used 1PM+1Add in nodes
that use intermediate results instead of 2PM+1Add as in the
original scheme. The authors analysed performance and se-
curity in the scheme of signature verification with many at-
tacks (independent and collusive). They noted that these at-
tacks do not have a large effect on their scheme. The modified
scheme has saved energy consumption 17.7-34.5% better than
the traditional scheme, as signature verification in the modi-
fied scheme is 50% faster than the original scheme. They im-
plemented their scheme on Micaz motes with the finite field
(F2163).
Furthermore, Li et al. [46] proposed a scheme to improve
scalar multiplication by reducing point additions. They pre-
sented a method to generate k depend on the generation of an
integer S periodically. They achieved good results in improv-
ing point addition
√
3/4× L whereas binary scheme (L/2).
Point doubling in their scheme is similar to previous schemes
(D&A, NAF, WM). Their scheme does not require additional
memory and depends on the growth rate of a small with bit
length growth in scalar(k). Also, it is appropriate to imple-
ment in H/W because it needs simple operands. Because
scalar multiplication (ECDSA) consumes a large time through
processing, that leads to power consumption [76]. The au-
thors exchanged linear point multiplication method with their
method using divide and conquer algorithm. This algorithm
uses a binary tree to quotient values and a skew tree to re-
minder values, where it processes points through parallel com-
putation method. Results showed that they achieved better ef-
ficiency than linear scalar multiplication in terms of a number
of clock pulses and power consumption. In 2017, Guerrini
et al. [77] have proposed a method of random scalar that re-
lies on the covering systems of congruence relationships. A
random was applied in a scalar representation using mixed-
radix SM algorithm. They generated n-covers randomly with
a greedy method, depending on available memory as well as
recommended selection of a large n. Also, they pointed out
that their method is more efficient, less expensive and incurs
fewer additional expenses for arithmetic operations than the
Coron’s randomization, D&A, NAF, and wNAF methods. Ta-
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ble 4 shows improvements on other SM methods.
4.2 Efficiency Improvement of Coordinate Systems
ECDSA has to perform complex operations; these operations
consume resources in constrained devices. Using the ap-
propriate coordinate system, could lead to reducing costs of
high computation in doubling and addition operations. The
improvement of computation complexity in PM depends on
point representation that is considered important in curve op-
erations [78]. Many different coordinate systems used with
these algorithms such as Affine, Projective, Jacobian, Chud-
novsky Jacobian, modified Jacobian, and mixed. Coordinate
systems are used to represent and contribute to speeding com-
putation in ECC/ECDSA algorithm. There is no coordinate
system to accelerate both point addition and doubling [3].
Some coordinate systems require faster or slower computa-
tion time in the point doubling and point addition operations
than other coordinate systems; for instance, point doubling
uses less computation in Jacobian while the point addition
uses more computation in the Jacobian than Projective and
Chudnovsky Jacobian coordinates.
• Using Affine Coordinate
Affine is a basic coordinate system that is used with dou-
bling and addition operations. This system uses two co-
ordinates (x, y). When point addition (P + Q) uses the
Affine system, then the cost of the resulting point (R)
is 1 inversion, 2 multiplication and 1 squaring, while
cost(R) in the case point doubling is 1 inversion, 2 mul-
tiplication, and 2 squaring [79]. Costly arithmetical op-
erations in point addition and point doubling are multi-
plication, squaring and inversion. Inversion operation is
much lower than multiplication operation. The Affine
coordinate system uses inversion operations [24]. In-
version operation is required in point addition and point
doubling when using Affine coordinate. But Affine coor-
dinate needs fewer multiplication operations than other
coordinate systems such as Projective coordinate [64].
• Using Projective Coordinate
Inversion operation is dramatically expensive in point
addition and point doubling. The Projective coordinate
system removes this operation and that leads to improv-
ing PM performance in ECC/ECDSA. This system uses
three coordinates (X,Y, Z) and Z 6=0 [79], which take
formula (X/Z, Y/Z) corresponding to Affine coordi-
nate. The Projective coordinate is represented as the fol-
lowing equation (with prime fields) [13]:
Y 2Z = X3 + aXZ2 + bZ3 (21)
López and Dahab also used three coordinates but us-
ing formula (X/Z, Y/Z2) and Z 6=0 corresponding to
Affine coordinate [80]. Their scheme improved origi-
nal Projective on a curve in the binary field. Further-
more, Projective coordinate is used with random binary
and koblitz curves (F2163 , F2233 and F2283 ) for NIST’s
standards instead of Affine [73]. This coordinate leads
to significant improvement in PM ECC and ECDSA.
Then, Hutter et al. [47] used randomized Projective co-
ordinate through generating a randomized number on
x-coordinate in base point. Also, different coordinate
systems have been discussed, such as Projective and
Affine coordinates [13]. Through experiments, the au-
thors found that Projective coordinates are faster by 91%
than Affine coordinates but Projective coordinate avoids
inversion operation, and vice versa for the memory, while
the Projective coordinates require more memory because
they use three coordinates (X,Y, Z). Oliveira et al. [78]
proposed λ-Projective coordinate through using three co-
ordinates (X,Y, Z) with binary field (F2254) to improve
computation efficiency in PM. The formula used for co-
ordinates is (X/Z,L/Z) corresponding with λ-Affine
formula, where the λ-Affine formula is (X,X + Y/X).
λ-Projective improved López and Dahab Projective(LD-
Projective), where the P + Q cost in λ-Projective is
11m+2s while in LD-Projective it is 13m+4s. Also,
2P + Q cost in λ-Projective is 10m+6s while in LD-
Projective is 11m+10s. In addition, λ-Projective im-
proved H&A to 60% in squaring and 6% in multiplica-
tion better than LD-Projective. Their scheme was imple-
mented on Sandy Bridge platform. The authors achieved
computation 69500 clock cycles through the single core
with H&A and 47900 clock cycles through the multi core
combining Gallant, Lambert, and Vanstone, (GLV) tech-
nique, H&A and D&A in SM unprotected. Also, they
achieved computation 114800 clock cycles through sin-
gle core protected. Their scheme achieves performance
better by 2% than Ivy Bridge and 46% than Haswell
platforms. In 2017, Al-Somani [81] proposed a paral-
lel SM method based on López-Dahab Projective that re-
quired 4 multiplications for DBL and 16 multiplications
for ADD. His scheme applied on FPGA and AT2 pro-
cessors and obtained high speed for SM’s performance
when this scheme was implemented on eight processors
with López-Dahab Projective.
• Using Jacobian Coordinate
This coordinate system does not require inversion in ad-
dition formula (addition and doubling), but uses inver-
sion only in the final computation stage. It is similar to
Pojective coordinate (also it is an improvement of Projec-
tive coordinate). Jacobian provides less running time in
point doubling and more running time in point addition
than Projective coordinate [64]. This system uses three
coordinates (X,Y, Z) and Z 6=0, which take formula
(X/Z2, Y/Z3) corresponding for Affine coordinate [79].
Y 2Z = X3 + aXZ4 + bZ6 (22)
Due to the point addition, Jacobian consumes more com-
putation time than other coordinate systems. Chud-
novsky Jacobian coordinate is proposed to accelerate
point addition in the Jacobian coordinate. This system
uses coordinates (X,Y, Z, Z2, Z3) and saves 1m+1s in
point addition [82]. This coordinate has a disadvan-
tage that point doubling is slower than Jacobian coor-
dinate [9]. The author pointed out that Chudnovsky is
the fastest in point addition and modified Jacobian is
the fastest in point doubling. A Jacobian coordinate is
used to improve running time in EC exponentiation with
fixed point and random point. This coordinate is bet-
ter than Affine and Projective coordinates [64]. Also,
modified Jacobian coordinate system was able to achieve
better performance than Affine, Projective, Jacobian and
Chudnovsky Jacobian coordinate systems, where Affine
has addition cost (i+2m+s) and doubling cost(i+2m+2s),
Projective has addition cost (12m+2s) and doubling cost
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Table 4. Improvements on different SM methods
Paper SM methods Subsequent improvements of SM (PA and PD) Field
[19] Traditional NAF 1/3 PA Fp
[64] wNAF
Random point: PA (33.7) and PD (157.9)
Fixed point: PA (30) and PD (15)
Fp160
[65] wNAF withEndomorphism Roughly 50% SM Fp160
[51] mbNAF 50% SM Fp and F2m
[13] Traditional D&A PA is 1/2 PD Fp
[62]
τ -NAF
τ -NAF with PH
1/3 PA and reduce PD
2n/7 PA and reduce PD
F2m (163,233)
[66] Frobenius with GLV 28.3% SM Fp
[67] Frobenius withtwisted Edwards curve 3n/4 PA and 1/2 PD Fp207
[46] Traditional window Reduce PA and PD compared with NAF Fp (192,256,512)
[24] Sliding window 10% better than NAF Fp512
[19] Variable-lengthsliding window 27.4% better than wNAF Fp







[15] Traditional Montgomery 8.5% SMmemory size (SM)=13.1k Fp (160,256)
[56] Improved Montgomery
Prime field: 21% SM is better than Q & A
13.5% SM is better than NAF
Binary field: 25.8% SM is better than Q & A
15.8% SM is better than NAF
Fp and F2m
[54] Improved Montgomery Reduce PA and PD intraditional Montgomery Fp
[70] Montgomery withparallel sequential roughly 51% SM with time=0.056ms F2191
[72] Montgomery withtwisted Edwards curve
Faster SM than traditional Montgomery
memory size (SM)=6.7k Fp (159,191,223,255)
[74] SM with side information 40% is better than traditional verification Fp384
[75] SM with Fibonacci Improve PA in D&A and reducePA cost (10%) F2m
[27] SM with intermediateresults Improve signature verification (50%) F2163
[46] SM with integer Speriodically
Improve PA (
√
3/4× L is better
than D&A, NAF, and WM
Fp (192,256)
[76] SM with binary tree Reduce SM time and complex computations F2m
[77] SM with random n-cover Reduce SM cost is better than D&A, NAF,and wNAF Fp
(7m+5s), Jacobian has addition cost (12m+4s) and dou-
bling cost (4m+6s), Chudnovsky Jacobian has addition
cost(11m+3s) and doubling cost (5m+6s) and, modi-
fied Jacobian has addition cost (13m+6s) and doubling
cost (4m+4s) [3]. This coordinate system is applied on
EC exponentiation through prime field (Fp160, Fp192 and
Fp224). Modified Jacobian is faster point doubling than
all previous coordinate systems. In addition, the modi-
fied Jacobian coordinate is used to represent addition for-
mula when ECDSA algorithm is implemented as authen-
tication protocol in wireless on processor ARM7TDMI
[2]. The authors implemented ECDSA with Fp with dif-
ferent field sizes (Fp160, Fp176, Fp192, Fp208 and Fp256)
depending on standards of ANSI X9F1 and IEEE P1363.
Through results, they get running time 46.4ms for sig-
nature generation and 92.4ms for signature verification
when using Fp160. They pointed out that their scheme
improved bandwidth and storage compared with previ-
ous schemes. Brown et al. [79] pointed out that Jaco-
bian is faster than Affine, Projective, and Chudnovsky
in point doubling. Through results, these coordinate sys-
tems improved speeding of computation in ECC/ECDSA
through reducing execution cycle.
• Using Mixed Coordinate Systems
The mixed coordinate system uses more one coordinate
system to represent addition formula (which each point
uses a different system) [3, 9] to get the best perfor-
mance and least computation time in PM. Many differ-
ent mixed coordinate systems such as Jacobian-Affine,
Affine-Projective, and Chudonvsky-Affine [79].
Cohen et al. [3] pointed out that modified Jacobian mixed
with other coordinate systems (Jacobian and Affine or
Jacobian and Chudnovsky Jacobian) presents a signifi-
cant improvement on computation time with the prime
field (Fp160, Fp192 and Fp224). Execution time is reduced
using Jacobian-Chudnovsky coordinate with prime field
(when using w=5 for Fp192, Fp224 and Fp256, and w=6
for Fp384 and Fp521). Also, Jacobian and Chudnovsky
coordinates improve PM performance and Chudnosky
is preferred although that requires some extra storage
(precomputation for points) [79]. Different coordinate
systems were investigated (Affine, Projective, Jacobian
and LD Projective) on point addition and doubling with
characteristic 3 in both Weierstrass and Hessian forms
[11]. The authors noted that Jacobian is the most efficient
with Weierstrass while Projective is the most efficient
with Hessian. Also, they used mixed coordinate (Affine-
Projective) on both Weierstrass and Hessian. Through
using mixed coordinate, results indicate improved timing
in addition formula. Mixed coordinate system (Affine-
Jacobian) is used to reduce m and s operations or to avoid
i operations [24]. Authors pointed out that mixed co-
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ordinate is better performance (6%) than Jacobian co-
ordinate. In the mixed coordinate, point addition con-
sumes 8m and 3s (12 modular reductions) while point
doubling consumes 4m and 4s (11 modular reductions).
Also, mixed coordinate is used with right-to-left NAF al-
gorithm [9], where applied Jacobian is used with point
addition and modified Jacobian with point doubling. The
author pointed out that modified Jacobian is fast in point
doubling but is slow in point addition; therefore, the au-
thor used Jacobian in point addition. Through results,
this scheme presented efficiency of a scalar by 13.33`m
(where ` is bits’ length in a scalar) compared with Jaco-
bian (15.33`m) and modified Jacobian (14.33`m). But
when three fields (temporary) variables additional are
used, then the left-to-right binary method described in [3]
was a better performance. Jacobian-Affine is faster than
other coordinate systems in point addition. Using Jaco-
bian coordinate in point doubling and Jacobian-Affine in
point addition [19]. Authors pointed out that Jacobian
is the fastest in point doubling and mixed coordinate is
the fastest in point addition. Oliveira et al. [78] used
mixed coordinate to compute 2P + Q where λ-Affine
was used to represent P point and λ-Projective to repre-
sent Q point. They achieved computation cost less than
LD-Projective. In 2017, Pan et al. [83] indicated that
mixed Jacobian-Affine coordinate is more efficient than
Jacobian coordinate. They applied a mixed coordinate
with ECDSA to improve the efficiency of computation
processes to authenticate users during online registration.
Their results indicated that mixed coordinate reduces cal-
culations in both point addition and point doubling. Ta-
ble 5 shows the successive improvements of different co-
ordinate systems in SM such as Affine, Projective, Jaco-
bian, and mixed coordinates.
4.3 Efficiency Improvement Via Algorithm Simplifi-
cation
This section will show some different approaches to improv-
ing ECDSA performance. A set of ideas which researchers
used to simplify the algorithm to improve the performance
ECDSA includes removing the inversion in the generation of
the signature and the signature verification, a collection of
signatures, using a few keys and using two points instead of
shared three curved points.
ECDSA algorithm is mainly used to provide integration, au-
thorisation, and non-repudiation depending on servers’ CA
(certification authority) [84]. The authors added an ID,
ECDSA threshold and trust value with the public key to au-
thorise node to gain access to the information. Also, it was
stated that data transmission of ECDSA in the wireless sen-
sor network (WSN) consumes more energy than computation
operations [85]. To reduce energy consumption, in data trans-
mission, all encrypted data aggregated from all sensor nodes
are directly sent to the Base station without decryption. This
operation leads to reducing energy consumption and increas-
ing network lifetime. Encryption and signing algorithms are
used for the collected data [86, 85]. Encryption algorithm EC-
OU (Elliptic Curve Okamoto-Uchiyama) is used to maintain
confidentiality and ECDSA algorithm to maintain integration,
both algorithms are used during homomorphic. The idea be-
hind this scheme is that encryptions, signatures and public
keys gathered together from all nodes are sent to aggregator
(CH), then these aggregators are forwarded to the top level
(parent aggregators) and so on up BS, that is, it is not the de-
cryption or signature verification in the aggregators, but these
processes are carried only in BS, that has a high capacity. The
authors concluded that this scheme offers energy and time ef-
ficiency due to a collection of encryptions and signatures that
are sent to the BS. Also, this scheme avoids the signature ver-
ification process that takes more time than the signature gen-
eration. In addition, it is efficient for large networks. Also,
ECDSA algorithm was investigated in detail [16], and con-
tains some of the problems that were related to using inver-
sion processes in generation and verification of the signature.
An inversion process consumes a great deal of time, which
affects the calculation. This process consumes 10 times the
multiplication process. In this scheme, the inversion process
was removed, and the results demonstrated that this scheme is
more efficient than the original ECDSA scheme. It had less
time and therefore less computation and energy. This scheme
was applied to the sensor node Micaz.
Using a few keys saved energy, memory and reduced the com-
putation in ECDSA algorithm [87]. Researchers used ECDSA
to secure the connection between the gateway and the clus-
ter head(CH), and CH and nodes. This scheme broadcasts
only session keys (km), which reduces energy, as the session
keys are deleted after their account. This operation leads to
less memory (only a few keys stored in memory). The pub-
lic key of the gateway does not require power, and calcula-
tion processes are accomplished through the use of a random
number and hash function that require less computation op-
erations. This scheme used periodic authentication in session
key. Therefore, it prevents attacks and is appropriate for en-
vironments of constrained-source. Finally, modified ECDSA
algorithm is proposed through using two curve points publicly
(public key Q and point of signature verification (x, y)) [88],
where the base point G becomes the private point. In this
algorithm, s parameter only is used (without using r parame-
ter) thus removing r overheads. The authors pointed out that
the modified ECDSA algorithm is less complex (more perfor-
mance) using less number of PMs, point addition and point
doubling than original ECDSA algorithm.
5. Security Improvement on ECDSA
In this section, we will consider the security in the ECDSA
algorithm. A list of mechanisms for improving the security in
ECDSA is given. In the beginning, we will come across types
of attacks, security requirements and countermeasures by cat-
egorizing them into non-physical and physical attacks, as each
category includes passive and active attacks. We then will of-
fer security mechanisms to enhance and protect ECDSA’s sig-
natures from tampering.
5.1 Categories of Attacks
First of all, we give a review of the attacks that threaten the
security level in the ECDSA algorithm. Attacks are becoming
increasingly sophisticated, so at the same time there should
be countermeasures against such attacks. But these counter-
measures are expensive in terms of time, storage, and complex
computations. Also, it is difficult to develop a countermeasure
for each attack [89].
When the ECDSA algorithm was implemented, it needed to
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Table 5. Improvements of different coordinate systems
Paper Coordinate system Subsequent improvements ofSM (PA and PD) Coordinate formula Field
[64] Affine 1i+2m (PA) and 1i+2m (PD)m is less than Projective (X ,Y ) Fp
[79, 13] Traditional Projective
12m (PA) and 7m (PD)
i is removed
91% is faster than Affine
(X/Z,Y/Z) Fp(192,224,256,384,521)





13m (PA) and 7m (PD)







13m (PA) and 11m (PD)
λ-Projective:
11m (PA) and 10m (PD)
(X/Z,L/Z) F2254
[81] LD-Projective withparallel SM Improved SM execution time (X/Z,Y/Z
2) F2163
[79, 13] Traditional Jacobian 12m (PA) and 4m (PD) (X/Z2,Y/Z3) Fp(192,224,256,384,521)
[9] Chudnovsky Jacobian 11m (PA) and 5m (PD) (X,Y, Z, Z2,Z3) F2m
[3, 2] Modified Jacobian 13m (PA) and 4m (PD) (X ,Y ,Z,aZ4) Fp (160,192,224)
[11] Affine-Projective
Weierstrass form:
9m (PA) and 1i+2m (PD)
Hessian form:
10 (PA) and 1i+5m (PD)





8m (PA) and 4m (PD)
6% is better performance
than Jacobian
(X ,Y ) and
(X/Z2,Y/Z3) Fp160
[9] Jacobian- modifiedJacobiann 11m (PA) and 3m (PD) (X/Z
2, X/Z3) F2m
[19, 83] Jacobian-Affine andJacobian 8m (PA) and 4m (PD)
(X ,Y ) and
(X/Z2, Y/Z3) Fp (224,256)
[78] λ-Projectiveand λ-Affine 8m (PA) and 4m (PD)
(X/Z,L/Z) and
(X ,X + Y/X) F2256
use countermeasures against known attacks [4]. The use of
standard criteria to credible organizations such as IEEE, ISO,
NIST, NSA, FIPS, and ANSI is extremely important to pre-
vent many attacks. Namely, the abnormal curves are weak
for attacks. In addition, the parameters’ validation of ECDSA
leads to strong security against attacks [21]. Protection of the
private key (d) and ephemeral key (k) in the ECC/ECDSA al-
gorithm are essential procedures because if an adversary could
get these the keys, the attacker is able to modify messages
and signatures and thus the ECDSA algorithm becomes use-
less. Therefore, a group of countermeasures have used to im-
prove security procedures. Many attacks such as signature
manipulation, Bleichenbacher and restart attacks work to re-
trieve the private key d or ephemeral k generator [21]. A set
of conditions (the difficulty of DPL, one-way hash, collision-
resistant, k unexpected) are installed to prevent such attacks
on the ECDSA. We will classify attacks on the ECDSA al-
gorithm for non-physical and physical attacks. Each cate-
gory includes many attacks that try to penetrate the signa-
tures of messages in terms of integrity, authentication, and
non-repudiation. We will then explain the countermeasures
applied by the researchers in their projects.
5.1.1 Non-Physical Attacks and Security Requirements
These attacks do not require physical access (indirect access)
to users’ devices or the network to penetrate repositories’ data
or messages transferred between the clients and server. The
attackers have used different strategies for physical attacks
such as sniffing, spoofing, eavesdropping, and modification
to break signatures and encoders transmitted through radio
frequency signals or the Internet [90]. They implement non-
physical threats to penetrate the security requirements of con-
fidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) during the im-
plementation of analysis and modification operations. Non-
physical attacks can use network devices indirectly. For ex-
ample, a DDoS attack uses network devices to send a stream
of messages to disable the server services [91]. These attacks
are categorized into passive and active attacks, according to
the strategies of these attacks and the intended target of the
attack.
5.1.1.1 Passive attacks
These attacks have used eavesdropping, monitoring, and sniff-
ing mechanisms to control and record the activities of network
devices, and then break user authentication signatures with-
out altering or destroying the data [92]. The attacker needs
to adjust a large number of packets through the use of packet
sniffing and packet analysis software to assist in the analy-
sis and penetration of signatures. These attacks are primarily
intended to penetrate authentication (signatures), encryption
(confidentiality), and access control (authorisation policies).
During these attacks, the attacker tries to analyze the data to
gain information about messages such as sender and receiver
IP addresses, transport protocol such as TCP or UDP, loca-
tion, data size, and time, as this information helps him in the
penetration operation [93]. Passive attacks do not perform any
changes to the network data, but the attacker can use these data
analyses to destroy the network in the future. This type of at-
tack is difficult to detect by security precautions because the
eavesdropper does not perform any data changes. But there is
also a set of security requirements that prevent such attacks.
Many research projects implement the ECDSA algorithm to
prevent the passive non-physical attack. Table 8 shows passive
non-physical attacks types in many applications with ECDSA.
A brief explanation of some of the most popular passive at-
tacks as follows.
• Traffic analysis and scanning (eavesdropping): Monitors
and analyses data as they travel over the Internet or wire-
less network, for example, monitoring data size, number
of connections, open ports, visitor identity and vulnera-
bilities in operating systems [94].
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• Keylogger and snooping: Records authentication activ-
ities in victim devices during keystrokes monitoring of
username/password [95].
• Tracking: Records and traces users’ information such as
location for network devices and personal information
such as name, address, email, and age [96].
• Guessing: The attacker attempts to guess a user’s creden-
tial by relying on words like dictionary attack or a com-
bination of symbols (probabilities) such as brute force
attack to gain access to the network [97].
5.1.1.2 Active attacks
An active attacker performs data penetration of users’ iden-
tities by creating, forging, modifying, replacing, injecting,
destroying, or rerouting messages as these messages move
through the network’s nodes or the Internet [93]. This type
of attack can use sniff attack (passive attack) to collect in-
formation and then performs changes or destruction of net-
work data. For instance, a malicious attacker intercepts money
transfer messages in e-banking applications and then imple-
ments adding and deleting operations to obtain personal gains
[95]. An active attacker can send false or fake signals to de-
ceive the network nodes by linking to the fake server and then
redirecting nodes’ packets to the legitimate server after mod-
ifying the data or authentication messages. Security require-
ments are significantly important, in particular, the authentica-
tion and integrity requirement, to prevent many attacks such
as man-in-the-middle (MITM) and replay [98]. According to
many research projects in [83, 99, 100, 20, 101], ECDSA’s
signatures is a security solution to prevent many attacks such
as modification, spoofing, denial, and cyber. Figure 2 shows
the classification of non-physical attacks. Table 8 shows active
non-physical attacks types in many applications with ECDSA.
A brief explanation of some of the most popular active attacks
is given in the following.
• Spoofing: Many types of attacks such as MITM, replay,
routing, and hijacking. The attacker intercepts and modi-
fies credential messages to gain access to the network by
MITM attack, while in replay attacks, the attacker inter-
cepts messages and resends them later [97]. Also, rout-
ing/hijacking changes the packets paths (changing the IP
address) by exploiting the vulnerability in the routing al-
gorithms used to find the best path for moving packets
[93] such as IP-spoofing and ARP-spoofing.
• Denial: These attacks are categorized as denial of service
(DoS) and distributed denial of service (DDoS). In DoS,
the attacker uses his own devices to prevent the server
from providing services to network members. This attack
targets security requirements (CIA), while in DDoS the
attacker uses his own devices as well as network devices
to quickly destroy the network [96, 93, 98, 92].
• Cyber: An attacker creates websites such as phishing at-
tacks or social pages for Facebook and Twitter, such as
social media attacks, to trick the user into believing that
these websites are legitimate websites or pages. The user
enters his/her confidential information such as username,
password and card number in these counterfeit websites
to allow this information to be accessed by the hacker
[95, 97].
• Modification: This attack changes, delays, rearranges
users’ data packets after gaining the attacker’s access
as a legitimate user or the attacker may be a legitimate
member of the network (internal attack). Any change to
this data can cause problems for the user such as chang-
ing medical or diagnostic reports in e-health applications
[96].
5.1.1.3 Security Requirements
The ECDSA algorithm provides three security requirements:
authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation. But integrat-
ing the ECDSA algorithm with security mechanisms such
as encryption and authorisation provides many security re-
quirements (such as confidentiality, authorisation, availabil-
ity, accountability, forward secrecy, backward secrecy, audit-
ing, scalability, completeness, anonymity, pseudonymity, and
freshness) when used in applications like e-health, e-banking,
e-commerce, e-vehicular, and e-governance. We will provide
a brief explanation of the security requirements that provided
by ECDSA as in the following.
• Authentication has been used to authenticate legitimate
users or data in the network to prevent anyone else from
accessing it. Namely, if the users’ identities or data is
a trusted source in the network it is accepted, but if an
unknown source it is ignored [102]. Many attacks such as
brute-force, keylogger, and credential guessing attempt
to penetrate the signatures’ authentication service.
• Integrity has been used to ensure that the transmitted
data has not been tampered with or edited by the adver-
sary [92]. Many attacks such as MITM, replay, hijack-
ing, and phishing attempt to penetrate the signatures’ in-
tegrity service.
• Non-repudiation has been used to detect the compro-
mised nodes via the sender who cannot deny his mes-
sage [98]. Many attacks such as repudiation, masquerad-
ing, and social media attempt to penetrate the signatures’
non-repudiation service.
5.1.2 Physical Attacks and Countermeasures
Physical attacks are passive or active attacks. The attacker ap-
plies a passive physical attack to analyse the signatures and
breaks the authentication property (gets the private key) to be-
come a legitimate user in the network. On the other hand,
the active physical attack attempts to penetrate the integrity
or non-repudiation property to change signatures and mes-
sages transferring between the network’s nodes. Many phys-
ical attacks have applied on ECC/ECDSA. These attacks ex-
ploit some problems in these algorithms in order to access the
private key [4, 43]. These problems include:





This type of attacks do not tamper with or modify the data
but analyses the leaked bits of data (such as the scalar’s bits).
These attacks take advantage of the different running time
for operations, power consumption and electromagnetic ra-
diation. The attacker tries to get some bits leaked from k
to produce the full value of k. The attacks that exploit the
power consumption and electromagnetic radiation to detect k
are called side channel attacks (SCAs). SCA attacks consist
of a suitable model, power trace, and statistical phase [4]. In
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Figure 2. Classification of non-physical attacks
these attacks, the attacker monitors the power consumption
and exploits the unintended outputs (side-channel outputs on
the secret key) of the device [13]. Leakage power consump-
tion is divided by the transition count leakage and Hamming
weight, where the first depends on the state variable bits at a
time, while the second depends on the number of 1-bits treated
in time [103] by tracking voltages of the device. SCA uses
many methods to detect k bits such as the analysis of the dis-
tinction between the addition formula operations, creation of
a template, statistical analysis, re-use values, special points,
auxiliary registers, and the link between the register address
and the key [43] (passive attack is described in Figure 3). SCA
attacks (passive) consist of four major attacks:
• Simple power analysis (SPA)
In this attack, the attacker relies on a single trace of
power consumption to detect the secret key bits. The at-
tacker extracts these bits based on power consumption
discrimination in the addition formula (point addition
(PA) and point doubling (PD)) [13, 43].
• Timing attack
In this attack, the attacker relies on the analysis of the
execution time of the addition formula and the arithmetic
operations [69]. For example, the attacker analyses the
processing time for PA and PD; if the processing time
is greater, it is considered PA (”1”) or else PD (”0”), and
repeats the process until he/she obtains all ephemeral bits
k.
• Template attack
In this attack, the attacker creates templates with a large
number of traces of the controlled device. It uses mul-
tivariate normal distribution to detect the key based on
power consumption during data processing. The attacker
gets the ECDSA’s key by matching the best template with
these traces [43, 104].
• Deferential power analysis (DPA)
In this attack, the attacker uses many traces in a statis-
tical analysis of power consumption. The attacker uses
hypothetical points in SM with stored recorded results.
He/she then compares these results with the power con-
sumption of the controlled device to obtain a valid guess
in the detection of secret key bits [105].
General countermeasures have used to prevent passive physi-
cal attacks [41]:
• Elimination of relation between data and leakages.
• Elimination of relation between fake data and real data.
The implementation of one of the former two countermea-
sures ensures data protection from attacks. Jacobi form has
been proposed instead of Weierstrass to prevent SCA attacks
[106]. This form allows for addition formula operations to
have identical time and power and this leads to prevention of
SPA and DPA attacks. Unfortunately, this scheme is 70% less
efficient than the original scheme (Weierstrass). The average
of field operations in their scheme is 3664 while in the orig-
inal scheme it is 2136. Many recommendations have been
presented with PM’s endomorphisms to protect many attacks
such as Pohlig-Hellman and Pollard’s rho through n ≥ 2160,
#E(Fq) 6= q and n is not dividable on qi−1 when 1 ≤ i ≤ 20
[65]. Similarly, a study presented DSA and ECDSA algo-
rithms in detail and discussed that these algorithms become
unsuitable for signing messages (integrity) if applied incor-
rectly, as this study has focused on the parameters validation
of DSA/ECDSA to ensure strong security for these algorithms
against different attacks; also, the author proved that these al-
gorithms become strong if the parameters are well-validated
[21]. In addition, Dimitrov et al. [56] proposed protection
mechanisms with double-base chains method against SCA at-
tack (SPA and DPA), using side channel atomicity against
SPA and randomization method against DPA [107]. Also,
right-to-left NAF algorithm was proposed without precompu-
tations and investigated security [9]. This algorithm protected
against SPA, DPA, and doubling attacks through using atom-
icity technique countermeasures.
Implementation of template based SPA attack in ECDSA was
investigated with microprocessor 32-bit (ARM7 architecture)
[104]. The authors pointed out that this attack is applicable on
ECDSA through three basics (few bits to retrieve k by lattice
attack, using fixed base point and microprocessors enough to
build templates) to combine with their attack. Furthermore,
Mohamed et al. [69] presented a scheme dependent on com-
bining comb method with width-wNAF. But, this scheme is
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Figure 3. SCA (passive) attacks
not resistant to SCA attacks. Therefore, they suggested us-
ing constant runtime to prevent SPA and timing (through add
point of infinity (O) when bits value equal nonzero and also
add it to precomputation values). Physical attacks are ex-
plained on ECC/ECDSA algorithms [43]. The authors de-
scribed many SCA attacks, as they presented countermeasures
and recommendations to apply ECC/ECDSA such as adding
randomness, countermeasures selection, and implementation
issues to prevent these attacks. Moreover, Rafik and Mo-
hammed [13] analyse SPA and DPA attacks (DPA analysis ne-
glected because it is not viable in the ECC/ECDSA algorithm
but SPA is applicable to ECDSA in WSN). DPA is not ap-
plicable in the case random scalar but is applicable in the case
using it against secret key (d) where the attacker knows signed
message [104]. SCA attack is working on the use of informa-
tion leaked from the SM (Q = kP ). They concluded that pro-
tecting the ephemeral k is important in ECDSA against SPA
attacks.
Template attack with lattice attack is presented to retrieve
ECDSA’s private key over prime field (Fp160) [108]. The
authors pointed out that endomorphism curves can be pen-
etrated by Bleichenbacher attack through using one bit of
bias. They had a secret key for ECDSA through few num-
ber of hours when using 233 signatures, 233 memory and
237 time. Varchola et al. [4] focused on the analysis of cor-
relation power analysis (CPA) attack on ECDSA algorithm
in FPGA. They did not use traditional power models (Ham-
ming weight/distance) in the analysis of CPA attack but used
another type as a countermeasure (chosen plaintext attack).
They proved possible successful feasible CPA in ECDSA on
FPGA in case k−1(e + rdA) or k−1e + (k−1dA)r, but also
CPA attack had no impact in ECDSA in case using equation
k−1e + (k−1r)dA (Results obtained by DISIPA platform).
Also, a SPA attack was suggested for SM penetration based
on conditional subtraction of a modular multiplication. Con-
stant time of modular multiplication is a guarantor to prevent
this attack from SM analysis. On the other hand, Liu et al.
[109] used secure-SM with randomized point coordinates to
prevent SPA, DPA, and ZPA. Table 6 shows the passive phys-
ical attacks and countermeasures.
5.1.2.2 Active attacks
There is another type of SCA attack, which uses errors to re-
veals some bits k, called fault attacks. This type of attack
exploits the error in the dummy operations, memory block,
invalid point and curve, and the difference between right and
wrong results. The attacker gets an error signature by adding
one bit to the generator k. This type of attack is considered a
serious risk to ECC/ECDSA algorithms if no proper counter-
measures have applied for applications and data transfer en-
vironment (Figure 4 shows active SCA attacks). SCA attacks
(active) consist of main three attacks:
• Safe-error based analysis
In this attack, the attacker uses faults to exploit dummy
operations (used to resist SPA) and memory blocks (reg-
ister or memory location). Safe-error includes two types
of c safe-error and m safe-error, where the first exploits
the vulnerability of the algorithm whereas the second ex-
ploits the implementation [41, 110].
• Weak-curve based analysis
In this attack, the attacker tampers with the curve param-
eters, where the error is injected by using an invalid point
and invalid curve at a specified time for the parameters
that were not correctly selected or validated. The attacker
uses the errors to move SM from the strong curve to the
weak and thus retrieves the private key [111, 43].
• Differential fault analysis (DFA)
In this attack, the attacker compares the difference be-
tween the correct and fault results to retrieve the scalar
bits. Differential fault includes two types: classic DFA
and sign change FA [43, 112]. Validation of intermediate
results and random ephemeral k are used to prevent clas-
sic DFA attacks while Montgomery ladder and verify the
final results used to prevent sign change FA attacks [41].




The former countermeasure allows the detection of the errors
that are added by the attacker whereas the latter prevents the
attacker from the discovery of scaler or private key, even af-
ter providing faults. The c safe-error attack is described on
ECDSA [110]. This attack exploits dummy operations in the
addition formula. The attacker can use errors with dummy
operations to discover bits of k. In [110] they proposed the
use of atomic patterns (Verneuil and Rondepierre patterns) in-
stead of the dummy operations to repeal the c safe-error. Also,
Fournaris et al. [112] suggested using a residual number sys-
tem (RNS) and leak resistant arithmetic (LRA) to prevent both
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Table 6. Passive physical attacks and countermeasures
Paper Passive physical attack (s) Countermeasure (s) Year




























selection depend on the
application and environments
2012
[108] Template with lattice Large prime finite 2014
[4] CPA k−1e+ (k−1r)dA 2015
[105] SPA Constant time modular multiplication,point blinding, random Projective 2015
[109] SPA/DPA/ZPA Secure-SM with randomized pointcoordinates 2017
Figure 4. SCA (active) attacks
differential faults (comparing the difference between correct
and fault results) and m safe-error (using block memory er-
rors) that are intended to retrieve bits from ephemeral k.
An invalid point attack is carried out on a weak single curve
during application skip of faults to move the points to weak
Weierstrass curves to retrieve the private key [111]. The au-
thors used point validation as a countermeasure to prevent
this attack. Since the device tests the validation of the point
on the curve, if it is incorrect, it generates an error message.
Moreover, Bos et al. [113] proposed using Edwards curves
with ECDSA (FP128,192,256) instead of Weierstrass curves to
prevent weak-curve attacks. They pointed out that Edwards
curves provide constant time and exception-free SM so these
attacks are not applicable. Similarly, Harkanson and Kim [6]
showed that there were safe and unsafe curves. They demon-
strated that curve25519 curve with 256-bit key length is secure
and fast.
The comprehensive survey presented information about fault
attacks on symmetric and asymmetric cryptography algo-
rithms [89]. The authors presented countermeasures to this
attack in different cryptography algorithms. They pointed
out that this attack may apply on ECDSA, and also pre-
sented countermeasures to prevent this attack on ECDSA.
Their countermeasures used against fault attacks are the addi-
tion of the cyclic redundancy check (CRC) in the private key
or using the public key to verify the signature before send-
ing it, but this process is expensive [89]. In addition, fault
attacks and types are discussed in [43, 114]. The authors
have referred to countermeasures to prevent these attacks such
as point validation and curve integrity check. According to
[115], many countermeasures known to repel various fault at-
tacks such as algorithm restructuring, physical protection of
the device, random techniques in computation processes and
power consumption with independent implementation. How-
ever, the authors noted that fault detection, intrusion detection,
algorithmic resistance and correction techniques are capable
of eliminating injection fault attacks. Furthermore, Barenghi
et al. [116] have provided a fault attack to retrieve the private
key. Their attack depended on the injection of errors in the im-
plementation of modular arithmetic operations in ECDSA sig-
natures. They used multiprecision multiplication faults with
scalar (k−1e + (k−2r)kd) to prevent the penetration of sig-
natures. Recently, Liao et al. [117] discussed invasive SCA
attacks such as fault attacks with ECC algorithms (F2m ). The
attacker injects errors into the victim’s device using tools such
as voltage glitch and laser. The authors pointed out that time
and location greatly affect the success of fault attacks. There-
fore, they proposed one multiplication module and one divi-
sion module to fix the timing of all operations. Table 7 shows
the active physical attacks and countermeasures.
5.2 Security Improvement Via the Random
One of the problems that leads to weak security in the ECDSA
algorithm is that there is not sufficiently random and thus
ECDSA produces unsafe keys. The random increase in
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Table 7. Active physical attacks and countermeasures
Paper Active physical attack (s) Countermeasure (s) Year
[89] Fault CRC and public key 2004
[114]
[43] Fault attacks and types
Point validation, curve integrity check,









[116] Invalid point Point validation 2015
[110] C safe-error Atomic pattern 2016
[113] Weak-curve Edwards curve 2016
[112] Differential fault andm safe-error
RNS and LRA
(random base permutation) 2016
[116] Fault Multiprecision multiplicationoperations 2016
[117] invasive fault Fix computing time 2017
ECDSA prevents penetration of signed messages, whether in
physical attacks or during transfer messages from the source
to the destination. For instance, Bos et al. [1] pointed out that
ECDSA used in Bitcoin suffers from poor randomness in the
signature, and this leads to penetration of clients’ accounts by
attackers. Therefore, the keys should not be duplicated, and k
should not be used for more than one message. Also, the ran-
domness source in ECDSA is extremely important to prevent
key leakage [118]. If the randomness source is bad this leads
to the generation of a bad signature. A bad signature allows
the attacker to leak bits of the key and thus discover the private
key. Danger et al. [10], Fan et al. [41], Fan and Verbauwhede
[43] pointed out to many countermeasures using randomiza-
tion in scalar (blinding, splitting, and group), point (blinding
and coordinates), register address, EC, and field isomorphism.
This section explains some researchers’ ideas to improve ran-
domness in ECDSA algorithm.
5.2.1 Random of Scalar
Point multiplication (kP ) in the ECDSA algorithm uses a ran-
dom scalar to provide strong signatures as a countermeasure
against modifying the data. But the use of scalar k with weak
random allows the attacker to reveal k and then forge signa-
tures. The scalar should be subject to several tests to prevent
weak random and make it difficult to predict scalar by the at-
tacks. Many methods have used to generate random scalars,
such as the use of hash functions or the use of generators.
Randomization source, Hutter et al. [32] used a SHA-1 al-
gorithm to generate ephemeral k and to gain appropriate ran-
domness as a countermeasure against side channel attacks,
where the generation of random k is according to FIPS’s stan-
dard. They pointed out that using a hash function with k
increases signature security due to changing k in each mes-
sage. Also, in the signature algorithm, they used equation
s = k−1e + (k−1r)d instead of s = k−1(e + rd) to pre-
vent DPA attacks. Moreover, Nabil et al. [14] used W7 algo-
rithm to increase random integer k in the ECDSA algorithm,
which showed that the W7 generator is better than other gen-
erators in performance and area. Also, [1] focused on the
weaknesses of ECC/ECDSA through the study of four SSH,
TLS, Bitcoin and the Austrian citizen card protocols. They
discovered that the ECDSA suffers from security weakness in
the same way as previous security systems. They focused on
the three points: deployment, weak keys, and vulnerable sig-
natures. They gathered databases belonging to the four pro-
tocols and found that several cases of repeated public keys
have used in SSH and TLS. Bitcoins suffer from several sig-
natures that share nonces that allow an attacker to compute
the corresponding private keys and steal coins. The Austrian
citizen card as well suffers from a multi-use of the keys. The
big problem with the signature is insufficient randomness in
generating keys or nonces in digital signatures. For exam-
ple, Debian OpenSSL. Koblitz and Menezes [119] discussed
random oracle model with ECDSA in the real world. They
pointed out this model is less dependent on random gener-
ators of weakness and gives more flexibility with modified
ECDSA. As they explained, modified ECDSA algorithm pre-
vents chosen-message attacks.
Randomization techniques, randomize with NAF was pro-
posed to prevent DPA attack [120]. This scheme required
n/2 for a number of point addition and n + 1 for point dou-
bling. The authors also proposed using randomized signed-
scalar with addition-subtraction multiplication algorithm to
prevent SPA attacks. Their algorithm required n + 1 for both
point addition and doubling. Their scheme is resistant to tim-
ing attacks because scalar changed in each running time de-
pending on randomized signed-scalar representation. They
explained through experimental results that their scheme is
resistant to power attacks. In addition, Samotyja and Lemke-
Rust [121] investigated the evaluation of randomization tech-
niques such as scalar blinding and splitting with prime-256,
brainpool256rl, and Ed25519 curves in ECC/ECDSA. Their
results demonstrated that these techniques prevent SCA at-
tacks. However, Bhattacharya et al. [122] investigated the
application of scalar blinding and splitting techniques in
ECC/ECDSA with asynchronous samples. They noted that
these techniques are vulnerable to branch misprediction, DPA,
and template attacks. To eliminate such attacks, they recom-
mended applying execution independence for scalar k or im-
plementing parallel random branching executions. Dou et al.
[107] noted that the integration of scalar randomization and
side channel atomicity techniques is a countermeasure against
SCA attacks such as SPA and DPA. Similarly, Poussier et al.
[123] pointed out that scalar blinding is a countermeasure
against SPA.
5.2.2 Random of point representation
The random to represent the point prevents an adversary from
knowing bits in the point after its representation in binary
[103]. Several methods have implemented to represent a base
point at random, such as point blinding (add a random point
to SM such as kP + R), random coordinate systems (such as
Projective and Jacobian coordinates) and the use of random
isomorphism.
Hedabou et al. [124] used randomness for intermediate val-
ues and special points through using randomized linearly-
transformed coordinates (RLC) to prevent refined power anal-
ysis (RPA) and zero-value point (ZPA) attacks. They pro-
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posed using randomized initial point method (RIP) to prevent
SPA and DPA attacks where RIP uses random point (R) with
point multiplication (kP ). ESDSA is vulnerable to fault at-
tack. Schmidt and Medwed [125] presented a fault attack
on ECDSA, attacker modifies program flow and tries to ben-
efit from error result to get parts (bits) for ephemeral key
k, then performs lattice attack to obtain the private key (d).
The authors implemented this attack on point multiplication
through Montgomery ladder and D&A algorithms. The suc-
cess of this attack is probability, as this attack tries to get on
bits from k through many signatures. They used the Jacobian
coordinate system through implementation because it is effi-
cient. Also, the authors used countermeasure to fault attack
through using a discrete algorithm l in point representation
(Q = (X : Y : Z; l), where modifying by the adversary for
point addition and point doubling is detection. This scheme
can prevent fault and SCA attack (with random mask). Us-
ing randomness point is recommended to prevent DPA attacks
[56, 69]. Liu et al. [126] adopted a randomized point in PM to
protect ECDSA signatures. They pointed out that a random-
ized point application with double-and-add-always prevents
SM’s bits from being attacked against multiple attacks such
as ZPA, SPA, and DPA. Also, point randomization with curve
Curve448 in ECC/ECDSA applied to transport layer security
(TLS) [127]. The results of this research indicate that this
protocol offers a 224-bit security level better than applying
the Curve25519 curve with 127-bit randomization technology
against SCA attacks.
Furthermore, Medwed and Oswald [104] described counter-
measure to prevent template based SPA attack using random-
ness coordinates in DPA resistance. Also, using verifica-
tion batches reduces the total time of ECDSA verification but
these batches suffer from some attacks. Randomizers used
symbolic computation in ECDSA batch verification to im-
prove security level against attacks [128]. The authors used
D&A and Montgomery ladder algorithms in their scheme.
They noted that using numeric computation with randomiz-
ers in x-coordinate (D&A) is faster and more secure than us-
ing Montgomery ladder algorithm in their scheme but original
D&A is faster than their scheme. Countermeasures (random-
ness coordinate) were used to prevent implementation attacks
[129, 124, 32, 33, 130]. A randomized Projective coordinate
(RPC) was used as a countermeasure to prevent differential
power analysis (DPA) and template based SPA attacks. RPC
has implemented through a random application in the Z coor-
dinate to represent the intermediate points in PM.
5.3 Security Improvement Via PM Methods
In Section 4, we have discussed how the PM method is used
to improve ECDSA efficiency. In this Subsection, we will
consider how the PM method is used to improve security in
ECDSA. Improvement of the efficiency of the PM’s methods
is dramatically important for ECDSA algorithm, particularly
when used in restricted-source environments, but at the same
time maintaining the security of this algorithm is more im-
portant because the basic mission of this algorithm is security
through integration of messages and protection from the mod-
ification, as well as authentication of messages and users in the
network. Many attacks on the security of this algorithm have
applied. Therefore, many ideas are presented by researchers
to improve the security of PM’s methods. PM’s method such
as D&A, Window, NAF, Comb, and Montgomery is proposed
to improve kP through reducing the number of operations of
addition and doubling. The attackers are taking advantage of
these operations (such as the computation time in addition op-
eration is longer than doubling operation) to obtain a secret
key or ephemeral key. Therefore, this Section describes some
of the recently improved methods for PM’s security.
Liardet and Smart [106] used combining point blinding and
randomized signed window method as a countermeasure
against SPA and DPA attacks. Also, an improvement on left-
to-right Window method was proposed with standard curves
such as NIST and SECG as a countermeasure against SCA at-
tacks [131]. The author added a special signed digit (−2w) to
{1, 2, ..., 2w − 1} in scalar representation in order to get addi-
tion formula operations in the uniform formula instead of us-
ing dummy addition that were revealed by attackers, thus pre-
venting SCA attacks. In addition, Möller [132] improved on
the idea in [131] through using right-to-left Window method
with 2w-ary. This scheme avoided using fixed table (used in
[131]) through randomization Projective, where this table al-
lows attackers to analyze information statistically. They used
two-processor in their scheme to improve the performance of
PM through parallel. Moreover, window and Montgomery
algorithms were improved to prevent SPA and DPA attacks
[8]. The small multiple was added to ephemeral key with the
idea of [131] in window method and combining addition and
doubling operations into the uniform formula in Montgomery
method where original Montgomery compute separately ad-
dition and doubling operations. Improvement on fixed-base
comb method was presented against SCA attacks [124]. Fur-
thermore, the authors used sequence non-zero of bit-strings
(i.e. removing all zeros only using 1 and -1) to represent the
ephemeral key. They pointed out that their scheme costs a lit-
tle more computation time than the original comb method.
Medwed and Oswald [104] used a double-and-add-always al-
gorithm to prevent SPA attacks in their scheme. Hutter et al.
[32] used Montgomery ladder algorithm to improve PM’s per-
formance and countermeasure against SPA attacks in their
scheme. Rafik and Mohammed [13] carried out SPA on many
methods for PM such as double-and-add, window, and comb.
They found comb method is optimal for their application to
prevent SPA attacks. Their results explained that the Secure-
CM was both more efficient timely (1.57s) and secure in its
implementations. Pessl and Hutter [33] used countermeasures
to prevent implementation attacks. They used zeroless signed
digit (ZSD) with comb method to prevent simple power anal-
ysis (SPA).
Karaklajić et al. [133] merged the López-Dahab method with
the Montgomery ladder. They pointed out that their scheme
provides security against FA attacks by using the Montgomery
method for coherent check and high probability detecting in-
jected errors. Oliveira et al. [134] have shown that the Mont-
gomery ladder with Galbraith-Lin-Scott (GLS) curves offers
a 128-bit security level against SCA attacks. In 2017, Feng
and Li [135] have noted that the ECC/ECDSA (256-bit) Comb
method has a bit leakage by a SPA attack. They improved the
Comb method by adding a signed representation to ephemeral
k to prevent SPA attacks completely.
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6. ECDSA Applications
Recently, many applications have become available that store
and move sensitive data for users between network nodes and
server. These applications require powerful encryption and
signature algorithms (such as ECC/ECDSA) to protect users’
information. We will show the most important applications
that use the ECDSA algorithm to provide security and privacy
requirements for this data. Table 8 shows ECDSA and recent
applications with non-physical attacks.
6.1 Electronic-Health
E-health provides services that allow healthcare providers and
patients to share medical records across various health centers,
such as hospitals, clinics, and even the home. These services
provide facilities to improve the health of patients. Because of
efficient methods of electronically sharing patient data rather
than traditional paper-based methods, patient health data is
available anywhere and anytime for healthcare providers and
patients. Health institutions and researchers are seeking to de-
velop these applications to improve the quality of care, disease
diagnosis, and remote medical surveillance [138]. E-health in-
cludes many systems such as electronic health record (EHR),
electronic medical record (EMR) and personal health record
(PHR), which are used efficiently to share medical records ei-
ther globally (EHR) or locally (EMR) and are administered
either by the authority provider (EHR and EMR) or by the pa-
tient (PHR) [139]. These applications also suffer from many
problems such as complexity in computations, lack of re-
sources, precision management, and mobility. However, the
main problem that threatens the acceptance of these systems
for patients and providers is the privacy of patients’ data. This
data or medical reports from WSN, laptop, and phone to an
e-health server are vulnerable to attacks and intrusion because
the Internet and wireless network are unsafe environments.
Data privacy is a key issue for any e-application specifically
for e-health applications. These applications require security
and privacy mechanisms such as authorisation policies, en-
cryption algorithms, and robust signatures to protect medical
repositories for patients from malicious attacks. Many exam-
ples of security refer to threats implemented against e-health:
• In 2013, there were penetration attacks on healthcare data
in US hospitals. These attacks revealed 85.4% of the
medical records (protected health information (PHI)) of
the 5 largest incidents for patients’ data [140].
• In 2016, Apple Health (Medicaid) was exposed for data
breach. This attack revealed 370,000 records for clients
in Apple Health (Washington state) [141].
• In 2017, an unauthorised individual penetrated EHR
the New Jersey Diamond Institute for Fertility and
Menopause. The hacker revealed PHI to 14633 record
containing patients’ information such as names, birth
dates, social security numbers, and sonograms [142].
According to the Vormetic report on data security 2016,
healthcare is one of the sectors that is most vulnerable to
hackers’ attacks and thus requires increased efforts to secure
health data by 64%. This report stated on 21 January 2016
that 91% of enterprises suffer from vulnerability threatening
data security (internal and external attacks). The study of se-
curity data included several countries such as Australia, USA
and Germany [143]. Therefore, many systems such as na-
tional e-health transition authority (NEHTA) in Australia and
health insurance portability and accountability act (HIPAA)
in the USA recommended applying security and privacy in
e-health applications correctly and accurately to prevent secu-
rity threats [144].
In addition, the accuracy of medical data is critical in di-
agnosing diseases and determining the condition of patients
during their online or wireless transmission from patient to
a healthcare provider. Also, penetration of the medical data
with diseases such as addiction, HIV infection, sexual and
dermatological conditions can lead to harassment, discrimi-
nation, even death of the patient if data reports change during
the transfer from client to server [145]. These penetrations
show that medical records in e-health require a high level
of security and privacy. Many modern projects implement
the ECDSA algorithm for high security and efficient perfor-
mance. ECDSA signatures (Koblitz with the key of 163-bit)
and energy-harvesting techniques were proposed to monitor
patients’ conditions by WSN in e-health [146]. The authors
applied the patient’s health surveillance scenario during the
deployment of a set of sensor nodes such as TelosB, Micaz,
and MagoNode ++. They generated a signature with a time
of 300ms and an energy consumption of 7mj. They con-
cluded that these results reduce time and energy in WSN to
serve e-health applications that deal with massive data. Ma-
sud and Hossain [99] proposed using ECC/ECDSA to protect
patients’ information in collaborating clouds healthcare based
on pairing based cryptography. Also, Ibrahim and Dalkılıç
[96] designed a scheme to support the privacy and security of
patients’ data in e-health. This scheme applied the ECDSA’s
signatures in the RFID tag to provide mutual authentication in
the protection of medical records. They pointed out that their
scheme is capable of preventing man-in-the-middle attacks,
tracking, eavesdropping, impersonation, replay, and cloning.
They used the Shamir scheme to reduce the cost of PM in sig-
nature verification (ECDSA) as well as security support. Their
scheme provided fewer calculations and more security in the
process of authentication of medical records in e-health.
6.2 Electronic-Banking
E-banks have used the personal information of their customers
to authorise access to their bank accounts. Many systems
have applied for dealing with bank accounts such as online
banking (OB), mobile banking (MB), credit card (CC) [147]
and automated teller machines (ATM) which require signature
algorithms to protect confidential information for customers.
E-banking implements a set of security measures to prevent
hackers and Internet thieves. Hackers are trying to create a
gap in these systems to hack users’ accounts. They have ap-
plied high-tech to penetrate customers’ credits. Therefore, the
process of authentication for legitimate users in e-banking ap-
plications is extremely important. Many examples of security
refer to threats implemented against e-banking applications:
• In 2012, millions of clients blocked access to their ac-
counts at the Royal Bank of Scotland [148].
• In 2015, the website www.000webhost.com was hacked
by a malicious attack. The result was the attacker’s ac-
cess to 13 million user accounts; the hacked data con-
tained personal information for customers (such as name
and plaintext password) [95].
• In 2016, DDOS attacks were perpetrated against HSBC
bank, which is one of the biggest banking names in the
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Table 8. ECDSA and applications against passive and active non-physical attacks
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world; these attacks led to the suspension of service for
two days and prevented customers from accessing their
accounts [148].
In the current era, authentication systems based on user-
name/password are no longer safe in protecting user accounts
[95]. We have investigated the adoption of ECDSA signatures
in modern e-banking applications and their ability to prevent
hacking threats. In 2017, Alhothaily et al. [95] proposed a
scheme to protect e-banking applications. They designed a
protocol to authenticate customers in e-banking applications.
Also, they pointed out that their scheme prevents e-banking
attacks such as phishing, shoulder surfing, keyloggers, data
break accidents and password-related attacks. Their scheme
relied on the ECDSA (256-bit) algorithm with SHA-256 to
sign the ticket. This ticket implements security mechanisms
to protect users’ accounts such as one-time username, ses-
sion key, ticket validity period, timestamp and add account
permission for each login operation. They pointed out that
their scheme provides protection against previous attacks as
it prevents reuse of credits. Moreover, Bojjagani and Sastry
[97] discussed that short message service (SMS) is not reli-
able in e-banking applications. These applications exchange
these messages with their customers in a dense and daily way
over the Internet or wireless network. They proposed a model
for protecting bank messages by using ECDSA (p-224) and
the elliptic curve integrated encryption scheme (ECIES). They
integrated the ECIES algorithm with signature verification in
ECDSA to support the authentication process in e-banking
applications. Their model achieves three stages (authentica-
tion, transaction, and notification) to complete the authorisa-
tion process between sender and receiver. They pointed out
that their scheme is efficient and reliable for real-time bank-
ing applications, against the attacks of wifi sniffing, reflec-
tion, replay, man-in-the-middle, phishing, and impersonation,
and provides end-to-end communication security between the
client and server. They demonstrated that the ECC/ECDSA
algorithm provides high performance in e-banking applica-
tions because these algorithms use small keys and an appropri-
ate computation cost for these applications compared to other
public key algorithms (such as RSA, DSA, and DH).
6.3 Electronic-Commerce
The Internet is important medium for providing services, shar-
ing information, buying and selling electronic products, ap-
plications, business transactions on an internal or external e-
commerce level. Business and e-commerce transactions infor-
mation have been shared between several parties, such as gov-
ernments, companies, and customers (consumers) via web-
sites. The Internet has brought a tremendous amount of posi-
tives but it has also made some negatives. The most important
drawback is hacking threats to personal and sensitive informa-
tion to get gains and benefits [83]. The progress of the huge
development of this technology has brought with it security
risks that threaten the personal information of users and at-
tempt to detect private keys in signing and encrypting data.
Due to a high demand for consumers and companies to mar-
ket products online, e-commerce requires secure signature al-
gorithms and is efficient to deal with tens of thousands of re-
quests per second. Many examples of security refer to threats
implemented against e-commerce:
• In 2016, the report in [149] pointed out that many pop-
ular websites have been hacked by credential replay at-
tacks (password reuse) for more than three billion user
accounts. Fraud attacks on e-commerce in the united
states are expected to hit $7 billion by 2020.
• In 2016, phishing attacks target e-commerce where 44%
of threaten customers and 11% of public activity [150].
• In 2017, the study of IP converge data services (IPC)
stated that more than 16,600 DDoS attacks were revealed
on e-commerce deals particularly on Valentine’s Day and
Chinese New Year [151].
Many currency signing systems have used in e-commerce
applications such as Bitcoin, Litecoin, Freicoin and Peer-
coin [152]. Most of these systems implement ECDSA sig-
natures to support security features (authentication, integrity,
and non-repudiation). A scheme to secure e-commerce and
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online transactions was proposed in [83]. The authors devel-
oped a graphic processing unit-universal elliptic curve signa-
ture server (Guess) with the adoption of the ECDSA signa-
ture mechanism (key of 256-bit binary) to provide signatures
with high-performance computations. They applied signature
as a service (SIGaaS) on an enterprise private cloud (EPC)
to secure e-payment over the Internet. They pointed out that
the Internet is an insecure medium because of the variety of
attacks that try to hack private keys. Also, they described
SIGaaS as impervious to private key attacks such as heart-
bleed and stealthy newly emerged. Their scheme described
the authentication issues between tenants and Guess. There-
fore, they have demonstrated that e-commerce applications
require robust authentication. For instance, Chinese Alipay
website fulfills huge requests and exchanges personal infor-
mation for users. This website performs more than 85,900
transactions per second. Therefore, this website requires an
efficient signature algorithm in terms of speed, time and se-
curity requirements to protect these transactions online. The
authors stated that the graphics processing unit (GPU) with
ECDSA showed high performance and security in dealing
with e-commerce websites such as the games market. Fur-
thermore, Mann and Loebenberger [101] used ECDSA to im-
plement two-factor authentication with e-commerce applica-
tions (Bitcoin wallet). They implemented a mutual signature
protocol with signature verification over a separate communi-
cation channel. Their scheme applied a threshold to support
a set of signatures, instead of one signature as well as using
the hash value in checking the payer and payee. They argued
that ECDSA and threshold signatures solved Bitcoin security
problems such as monitoring transaction details (block chain
public) and transaction size. They also pointed out that ran-
domization is significantly important in preventing malicious
attackers from discovering the secret key in ECDSA.
6.4 Electronic-Vehicular
Vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) applications are impor-
tant modern applications to secure people’s lives on the road.
These applications are a collection of network cars that share
information such as police, emergency, and smart taxi cars.
These applications regulate network traffic to ensure safety
for users while enforcing road laws. Several features for
VANET applications have used such as self-regulation, dis-
tributed communications environment, and dynamic topology.
These applications have been designed to avoid traffic conges-
tion, prevent accidents, and prevent violations of road rules.
The primary objective is to protect passengers on the road.
This type of network operates with two categories: vehicle
to vehicle (V2V), and vehicle to infrastructure (V2I). VANET
is a class of mobile ad hoc network (MANET) network but
it works regularly and not randomly. The critical issue and
great challenge for this type of application is security due to
the VANET network sharing nodes information in the open
medium [153]. To protect users in a VANET network, en-
cryption and signature mechanisms should be used to prevent
the risks of modifying messages between nodes. Many at-
tacks threat the VANET application such as impersonation,
Sybil, modification, DDoS and reply. To prevent these attacks
the confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) security
requirements should be applied. Many examples of security
refer to threats implemented against e-vehicular:
• In 2015, a hacker successfully carried out a cyber attack
to hijack and control a Jeep car over the Internet. This
attack prevented the driver from taking control of his car
[154].
• In 2017, the report in [155] stated that a hacker pene-
trated board messages for highways in California. This
hacker targeted to distract drivers and endanger them.
The report reported that 58.85% of attacks such as DDoS,
cyber and brute forcing were rated as high risk for
VANET applications.
The ECDSA algorithm was used to authenticate messages
with VANET [156]. Though the results, the authors noted de-
lay generation key, signature, and verification increase with
an increase in curve size. This scheme provides integrity,
authentication, and non-repudiation, as it is convenient for
constrained-source networks. Also, Franeková et al. [20]
have provided a security analysis of the ECDSA algorithm
(key lengths of 160, 192, 224, 256, 384 and 521) with
VANET (V2V) applications. They applied many curves to
the ECDSA (OpenSSL library) such as prime, pseudoran-
dom binary, Koblitz binary. They also focused on data trans-
fer scenarios and used the Riverbed Modeler tool to analyze
data transferred between vehicles. Their scheme discussed
whether VANET can be exposed to many attacks such as fake
entity, position counterfeit, and Sybil. To generate sufficient
security in these applications, at least the NIST p-224 and
NIST p-256 keys should be used in ECDSA. They noted that
the important parameters that affect the efficiency of signa-
tures in an e-vehicular environment are the size and time of
signature generation and verification. They concluded that
ECDSA p-224 or p-256 provides efficiency (time and size
of data) and adequate security to secure e-vehicular (V2V)
applications. In addition, Rajput et al. [98] argued that the
privacy of location information and identity should be safe
in e-vehicular applications because changing this data could
lead to fatal accidents. They applied a method of authen-
tication based mainly on the signatures of ECDSA with a
pseudonym to provide anonymity to the vehicular applica-
tions. Also, they pointed out that their scheme is capable of
preventing malicious attacks such as location tracking, modi-
fication, impersonation, bogus information, Sybil, replay, and
DOS. Their scheme supports standard security requirements
as well as traceability and low overheads. In their scheme, the
pseudonym consists of signing ECDSA, timestamp and a ran-
dom number. They pointed out that a lightweight pseudonym
is sufficient to support security in e-vehicular applications
against malicious attacks.
6.5 Electronic-Governance
E-governance is an application that provides services to stake-
holders through various communication technologies such as
Internet, SMS, and email to simplify the procedures of ser-
vices for citizens, business, and government agencies. This
application consists of four types of transactions involving
government to citizens (G2C), government to business (G2B),
government to employee (G2E), and government to govern-
ment (G2G) [157] to deal with various data types of stake-
holders. The adoption of these applications in society should
meet a high level of citizen confidence through a range of
requirements such as flexibility, transparency, accountabil-
ity, manageability, good governance, as well as trustwor-
International Journal of Communication Networks and Information Security (IJCNIS)
31
Vol. 11, No. 1, April 2019
thy (security and privacy) services [158]. According to a
United Nations report, a significant increase is in the devel-
opment of e-governance applications in some countries of the
world, but the issue that restricts their use is the security of
data and the privacy of the stakeholders (citizen, government,
business, employees, intermediaries and service providers)
against hacking attacks [159]. These applications are a large
pool of databases of diverse sources; therefore, these appli-
cations are exposed many risks such as legitimate users, e-
government employees, foreign intelligence agencies, busi-
ness enterprises, terrorist organizations, software providers,
and natural disasters. Sharma and Kalra [157] referred to sev-
eral attacks against e-governance such as DOS, insider, im-
personation, replay, and offline password guessing. Many
examples of security refer to threats implemented against e-
governance:
• In 2012, 112 Indian government websites such as the
Planning Commission and the Finance Ministry were
hacked. The hacker stopped these websites from work-
ing for weeks [160].
• In 2017, a cyber attack was carried out against Australian
government websites such as the Finance Department
and Australian Electoral Commission. This attack re-
vealed online sensitive information of more than 50,000
records [161].
To secure citizen’s data in e-governance applications, security
requirements should be applied. Several procedures have used
to secure the privacy of users such as server security, network
security, data security, workstation security as well as physi-
cal and environmental security [159]. Most developed coun-
tries such as USA, UK, and some other NATO member coun-
tries use ECC/ECDSA to secure the privacy of citizens’ data,
as well as to protect interoperability between governments
[162] and internal communications to prevent data fraud at-
tacks. Jain et al. [136] have demonstrated the importance of
applying public signatures to e-governance that authenticate
stakeholders in the system. The availability of efficient digi-
tal signatures will provide a powerful e-authentication mech-
anism that will allow citizens to safely handle government
documents (such as property tax, income tax, license, visa,
passport, and identity card services). These applications in-
vest technologies such as cloud computing and Big Data in
dealing with large amounts of citizen data, but also provide
significant challenges for developers of these technologies in
terms of security and privacy. Moreover, Singh et al. [102]
argued that e-governance applications store large amounts of
citizens’ data in various technologies such as cloud comput-
ing. They proposed applying ECDSA signatures to protect
cloud computing data from change with recommendations for
using ECDSA with accurate parameters. In addition, Lo’ai
et al. [100], Zefferer et al. [137] have noted that ECC/ECDSA
is the best algorithm for signing and encrypting sensitive data
transmitted through e-governance applications. They also dis-
cussed that several SCA attacks try to penetrate the private
key in ECDSA. Furthermore, they explained that there is no
countermeasure to block all hacker attacks, but a set of coun-
termeasures should be used to secure data sharing.
7. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we made a detailed study of the security and ef-
ficiency of the ECDSA algorithm. This study enabled us to
see the recent improvements for ECDSA in terms of security,
efficiency, and application. This updated improvement may
possibly inspire some ideas to improve some of the methods
in the security and efficiency of the ECDSA. We hope that this
study will be useful for researchers to locate research ideas
in securing and improving the efficiency of the ECDSA algo-
rithm, especially when used in the constrained source devices.
Several future works that we intend to accomplish:
• We intend to implement the ECDSA algorithm in e-
health applications to apply the integrity and authentica-
tion properties to protect patients’ data by the design of
the authentication and authorisation protocols for users
in the network.
• We intend to implement lightweight curves such as
Edward curve, the Montgomery SM method, and λ-
Projective in [78] that are critical procedures to increase
the efficiency of implementing ECDSA signatures in ac-
cessing a massive database of e-health.
• We intend to use lightweight hash algorithms to generate
random ephemeral k and personal information for health-
care users. These algorithms provide high performance
in computations operations.
• We intend to investigate the application of the ECDSA
algorithm with homomorphic and anonymity mecha-
nisms to secure source-constrained devices data such as
WSN. These devices require efficient and secure mech-
anisms to protect patients’ data when transferred from
WSN to e-health.
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[61] K. Fong, D. Hankerson, J. López, and A. Menezes, “Field inver-
sion and point halving revisited,” IEEE Transactions on Computers,
vol. 53, no. 8, pp. 1047–1059, 2004.
[62] R. M. Avanzi, M. Ciet, and F. Sica, “Faster scalar multiplication
on koblitz curves combining point halving with the frobenius endo-
morphism,” in International Workshop on Public Key Cryptography.
Springer, 2004, pp. 28–40.
[63] D. Hankerson, A. J. Menezes, and S. Vanstone, Guide to elliptic curve
cryptography. Springer Science & Business Media, 2006.
[64] A. Miyaji, T. Ono, and H. Cohen, “Efficient elliptic curve exponentia-
tion,” Information and Communications Security, pp. 282–290, 1997.
[65] R. P. Gallant, R. J. Lambert, and S. A. Vanstone, “Faster point multi-
plication on elliptic curves with efficient endomorphisms,” in Annual
International Cryptology Conference. Springer, 2001, pp. 190–200.
[66] T. J. Park, M.-K. Lee, K. Park, and K. I. Chung, “Speeding up scalar
multiplication in genus 2 hyperelliptic curves with efficient endomor-
phisms,” ETRI journal, vol. 27, no. 5, pp. 617–627, 2005.
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ing comb method against sca attacks,” in International Conference on
Information Security Practice and Experience. Springer, 2005, pp.
85–96.
[125] J.-M. Schmidt and M. Medwed, “A fault attack on ecdsa,” in Fault
Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography (FDTC), 2009 Workshop
on. IEEE, 2009, pp. 93–99.
[126] Z. Liu, D. Liu, and X. Zou, “An efficient and flexible hardware im-
plementation of the dual-field elliptic curve cryptographic processor,”
IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics, vol. 64, no. 3, pp. 2353–
2362, 2017.
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